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ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt to reveal the main policy tendencies 
held by the opposition parties of the TGNA between the period 1960 and 
1980. Especially due to the unfavorable political culture and legal structure of 
Turkish politics, the political parties of the pre-1960 employed a regime- 
oriented tendency for the further liberalization of the political system. The 
program-based competition of the opposition behavior started only after the 
establishment of a liberal political system which was introduced by the 
authorities of the military intervention of 1960. In this framework, the 
increase and eventual decrease of the program-based opposition, in terms of 
the policy formulation attempts of the parliamentary political parties was 
discussed.
In this study, it is also intended to determine the factors stemming from 
the nature of political parties or political system, including party system. 
Constitutional structure, electoral law, parliamentary procedures, which are 
influential in determining the opposition behavior in Turkish politics.
n
ÖZET
Bu çalismanin amaci, 1960-1980 dönemi TBMM’inde temsil edilen 
muhalefet partilerinin politikalarini incelemekdir. Esas olarak, Türk siyasal 
kültürü ve yasal yapisi muhalefetin olusmasina elverişsizliği nedeniyle, siyasi 
partiler 1960'a kadar siyasal sistemin liberalleşmesi için rejime yönelik bir 
politika izlemişlerdir, programa yönelik muhalefet da\ranisi ancak 1960 
darbesinden sonra kurulan, liberal bir siyasi ortamda mümkün olmuştur. Bu 
çerçevede, programa yönelik muhalefetin, siyasal girişimlerin niteliğine 
dayanarak, yükselişi ve düşüşleri tartisilmistir.
Ayni zamanda, bu çalismada, parti ya da siyasi sistemin yapisindan 
kaynaklanan ve muhalefetin davranisi üzerinde etkili olan anayasal yapi, 
seçim ve parti sistemleri ve parlamentonun iç kurallari da dahil olmak üzere 
bazı faktörler gösterilmeye çalisilmistir.
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Introduction
Eva Kolinsky compares the fate of opposition, in any political system, to the 
loser in the final cup that media attention turns to the victorious team and expect 
everything from the winner who proved capability gaining the political authority as 
the locus of the decision making.' So, the importance of the opposition is neglected 
though it is accepted to be an essential element of democratic systems. Today, the 
existence of opposition is the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself; and 
the absence of opposition party is taken as the one evidence that the political system is 
not democracy.- Because, the conflicts among people, stemming from cultural, 
economic or political cleavages, can only be managed by increasing the inclusiveness 
of the political system providing it with a competitive character. Permission of 
opposition to the ruling party or parties is the basic prerequisite of a competitive 
democratic system.^
In fact, no government can claim the representation of the whole population 
over whom it rules, nor it can demand the support of them as a whole. There is no 
country where all people do have the same preferences to be satisfied by a static 
government.“* People have different political preferences, economic interests, cultural, 
regional and religious affiliations which multiplied in modern societies. The 
differentiation between groups of people resulted in different expectations to be 
satisfied by the responses of government that is attainable only if the right for the
' Eva Kolinsky, Opposition in Western Europe (London and Sidney: Crom Helm, 1987), I.
- Robert Dahl "Government and Political Oppositions," in Handbook of Political Science, eds. F. I. 
Greenstein and N. W. Polbsby (London, Amsterdam, Don Mills, Ontario, Sydney),! 16.
■* Robert Dahl, Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Pre.ss, 1971), 10.5-123.
“* Robert Dahl, Regimes and Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), I.
organization, expression and representation of the social cleavages is preserved.^ 
Although the responsiveness of the government depends on the extend to which a 
certain group controls the governmental mechanism, the ability of out groups in 
organizing against the policies of existing government provides them with the power 
to enforce changes in the policies of government while producing alternative policies 
to be considered in the next elections. During the period between elections, the 
activities of opposition play the major role in checking and limiting governmental 
authority in a democratic political system.
The above approaches to the concept of opposition is a traditionalist view which 
treats the opposition as solely as a formal political institution, that is in the sense of 
parliamentary opposition. At the other extreme, opposition can be taken to include 
virtually all expressions of dissident in society that directly or indirectly impinge on 
government,'’ but they can not be taken as an alternative government. The non- 
parliamentary opposition intends to preserve interests of some social sectors without 
posing an alternative personnel or program to those of government.
This study aims at describing the policy tendencies of the parliamentary 
opposition in Turkey, in the period between 1960 and 1980. The attempts undertaken 
by the opposing parliamentary political parties, in order to create socio-economic 
alternatives to the policies of the government as well as to the existing regime, while 
checking and balancing the power of the ruling party, will be the focus of the study. 
By regarding to the policy alternatives and strategies of the opposing parties, the 
nature of these parties in the existing legal and political structure will also be taken 
into consideration. The main thesis of the study is that since the parliamentary 
opposition did not have constitutional guarantees until the promulgation of the 1961 
Constitution (1876-1960), the locus of the alternative opposition policies were on the
 ^ Kolinsky, Opposition. 3.
Ciordon Smith, "Party and Protest: The Two Faces of Opposition in Western Europe," in Opposition 
in Western Europe, ed. Eva Kolinsky (London and Sidney: Crom Helm, 1987), 49.
regime issues {regime-oriented), on the further democratization of the political system 
which would serve to the political opposition to obtain equal opportunities in the 
competitive political system. When the 1961 Constitution institutionalized the place 
of opposition in the political system, they began to develop alternative socio­
economic policies which are expected to attract the support of the larger population.
In order to test the above mentioned hypotheses, a secondary data analysis will 
be held. The books, articles and the papers written on the Turkish political 
developments of the period are the main sources of this analysis. Due to the limited 
scope of the study, analysing primary data, e.g. parliamentary records, and holding 
interviews with the living political personalities of the period were excluded.
This study comprises the following parts:
1. In the first chapter, the concept of political opposition is defined; and the 
types and patterns of oppositions which are determining factors on the nature and 
effectiveness of the policies of opposing parties are specified.
2. In the second chapter, the aim is to reveal the tradition of political opposition 
in Turkish socio-economic and political systems, in order to explain the unfavorable 
historical background.
3. In the third chapter, the process of the establishment of favorable political 
and judicial structures, for the security of the political opposition, with the 
promulgation of the 1961 Constitution is explained. The first phace of this chapter 
(1961-1965) is a transition period which includes also effects of the military 
existence, in civilian politics, on the nature and actions of political opposition. The 
second face (1965-1979) is the period which realized the liberal system established by 
the transitory military regime of the 1960. The Constitutional guarantees for the legal 
existence of the political opposition motivated them to develop alternative socio­
economic policies to the policies of the government, in order to capture the political
power: The competion of the opposing parties gained a program-based character. The 
emergence of the socialist Labor Party of Turkey (LPT), ultranationalist Nationalist 
Action Party (NAP), pro-religious National Order Party (NOP), the leftist defection 
of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), and the increase of the pro-big bourgeois 
policies and the eventual split within the .lustice Party (JP) are evaluated in this 
context.
4. in the forth chapter, the decrease of the program-based competition in the 
struggle of the political opposition is discussed through the increasing fragmentation 
and ideological polarization of the political party system. The chapter is expected to 
demonstrate that the result of the ideological fragmentation and polarization resulted 
in the 'politics of absurd' with unfair and irresponsible opposition tendencies.
CHAPTER I.
The concept o f Political Opposition and Its Dynamics 
What is Political Opposition?
Given the broadness of the concept, it is very difficult to define the opposition
precisely. In its general meaning, "opposition is the situation of being against a view,
an attitude or a behavior. In political terms, opposition means to be opposing to the
existing socio-economic structure, political regime, the policies or the personnel of
the government; one or some of them in addition to the function of producing
alternative policies to those of government."'^ For an institutional form, like
parliament, Dahl proposes the following definition:
Suppose that A determines the conduct o f some aspects o f the 
government o f a particular political system during some intei-val. And 
during this inteiwal B can not determine the conduct o f the government 
and that B is opposed to the conduct of government by A. Then, B is what 
we mean by an ’opposition'. Note that during some different interval, B 
might determine the conduct of the government.^
As the definitions make it clear, the term ’political opposition’ is used for both 
the specification of political actions which aims at checking and controlling the 
policies of the ruling body, and the political institution itself who represents these 
political oppositions at the governmental level .^
The classical means of political opposition are political parties. Obtaining 
political power in order to articulate the different interests in the society to the 
governmental level is the goal of the political parties. In multi-party systems, those
 ^ Nükhet Turgut, Siyasal Muhalefet (Ankara: Birey-Toplum, 1984), 8.
 ^ Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966), 18-19.
Turgut, Siyasal, 4.
who could not win enough votes to form the government leave in opposition to check 
and limit governmental authority while preserving the rights and interests of the social 
strata they represent, and while providing the people with an alternative in the 
political system.'" However, this definition is valid only for the political systems with 
a multi-party democracy. In a single-party system, where the real opposition is found 
inside the party, external political party opposition does not exist. In that case, the 
form of the opposition is as either dissident groups or minority tendencies, which 
criticize the government at party meetings with varying degrees of freedom, including 
the parliamentary level as well. The aim of giving way to a limited opposition is, 
mostly, not to create an alternative to the existing regime or the government, but to 
control the emergence of such an alternative.' '
However, the oppositional activities can not be confined to the political parties 
only, all social and professional institutions, illegal organizations, even individuals are 
the potential opposition having certain economic and political preferences. They do 
also engage in oppositional activities through violent or non-violent strategies like 
strikes, demonstrations, assassinations or through bargaining with ruling and the 
opposing parties in the parliament. Such non-parliamentary bodies try to effect the 
policies of the government. They also try to have their demands accepted as policies 
by the parties that appeared most hospitable to them, but they avoid establishment of 
direct links with the existing political parties and do not aim at capturing the political 
power.'“ Considering this dispersed nature of political opposition. Smith prefers to 
define all party, par-party and extra-party political activity as 'political opposition'.'^
Ibid., 8-9.
'' Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen, 1964), 415-416.
Peter Pulzer, "Is There Life After Dahl?," in Opposition in Western Europe, ed. Eva Kolinsky 
(London and Sidney, 1987), 22-26.
'·' Smith, "Two Faces," 49.
who could not win enough votes to form the government leave in opposition to check 
and limit governmental authority while preserving the rights and interests of the social 
strata they represent, and while providing the people with an alternative in the 
political system.However, this definition is valid only for the political systems with 
a multi-party democracy. In a single-party system, where the real opposition is found 
inside the party, external political party opposition does not exist. In that case, the 
form of the opposition is as either dissident groups or minority tendencies, which 
criticize the government at party meetings with varying degrees of freedom, including 
the parliamentary level as well. The aim of giving way to a limited opposition is, 
mostly, not to create an alternative to the existing regime or the government, but to 
control the emergence of such an alternative.' ‘
However, the oppositional activities can not be confined to the political parties 
only, all social and professional institutions, illegal organizations, even individuals are 
the potential opposition having certain economic and political preferences. They do 
also engage in oppositional activities through violent or non-violent strategies like 
strikes, demonstrations, assassinations or through bargaining with ruling and the 
opposing parties in the parliament. Such non-parliamentary bodies try to effect the 
policies of the government. They also try to have their demands accepted as policies 
by the parties that appeared most hospitable to them, but they avoid establishment of 
direct links with the existing political parties and do not aim at capturing the political 
power.'- Considering this dispersed nature of political opposition. Smith prefers to 
define all party, par-party and extra-party political activity as 'political opposition'.*^
'<* Ibid., 8-9.
'' Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen, 1964), 415-416.
Peter Pulzer, "Is There Life After Dahl?," in Opposition in Western Europe, ed. Eva Kolinsky 
(London and Sidney, 1987), 22-26.
Smith, "Two Faces," 49.
The parties who are institutional form of direct political opposition at the 
governmental level demonstrates variations in types and patterns that determine their 
legal existence as well as their potent in a competitive political system. Then, in order 
to be able to explain the oppositional actions of a political party, we need to, first, 
elaborate its characteristics stemming from both the political system and the party's 
nature itself.
Types o f Political Opposition
Although all oppositions try to make changes in the system or in the policies 
and/or personnel of the government, the differentiation in goals, strategies and 
structures lead to the emergence of different types of political oppositions in the 
political systems.
Constitutional (Loyal) & Non-Constitutional
If the opposition has a goal differentiation incompatible with the system 
established by the principles of the constitution, the opposition is non-constitutional. 
An opposition is non-constitutional in terms of three criteria. First, the foundation of 
the opposition, the existence, may be contrary to the principles of the Constitution - 
written or unwritten-. Second, the actions or the strategy held by the opposition would 
be rejected by the constitution. Third, the goal of the opposition would be 
incompatible with the established constitutional stmctures. in fact, this type of 
opposition is unconstitutional not because it has anti-system goals, but it is likely to 
employ extreme, violent strategies which would threat the system. In spite of having 
goals contrary to the Constitution, an opposition is constitutional as long as it 
functions within the established system of rule.·^ In that case, the strategy and the 
existence of the opposition are most determining on the constitutionality of the
Otto Kircheimer, "The Wanishing Opposition," in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, 
ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 237.
Turgut, Siyasal, 10-12.
opposition. Although the foundation of the fascist parties was prohibited in many 
European countries after the World War II, the communist parties whose goals are to 
change the existing system, are permitted to function since they remained in the 
borders of the constitutional structure.
Structural & Non-Structural
An opposition seeks to achieve changes either in the essential structure of the 
socio-economic and political system or in the policies and/or the personnel of the 
government.'^ If the first two are the goals, then the opposition is structural, it is non- 
structural and when it does not aim a structural change, it is non-structural.
A structural opposition is either reform or revolution oriented in the sense that it 
seeks to implement the changes through incremental modifications or a radical action, 
like revolution, replacing the existing socio-economic, political structures with a new 
system favored by the opposition as an alternative.'* As it is clear enough, the 
evolutionary structural opposition works through legal institutions, the revolutionary 
political oppositions seek to challenge them. In that case, the opposition is 
constitutional as long as it accepts the rules of the game, the existing legal structure 
and function within the legally defined borders.
Whatever the long term goal of the opposition, the immediate goal of any 
constitutional opposition -structural or nonstructural- is to obtain political power 
through elections in order to achieve the long term goals by implementing 
incremental r e fo rms .When  it fails in elections, the attention turns on the 
government to force it for the changes suitable to the program of the opposition. The 
social democrat parties follow a similar strategy: Policy opposition to force the
Smith, "Two Faces," .“iT-SS. 
Dahl, Western, 341.
'* Smith, "Two Faces," 56. 
Turgut, Siytisal, 13.
government for the changes when in the opposition and to implement incremental 
reforms that would lead to the eventual replacement of the existing structures in the 
long run, when they are in the power.-'^
There is a connection between the strategies of the opposition and the sequence
of the goals. Turgut argues that:
If tlie constitutional strategy is employed, getting the political power is 
the immediate goal, even affecting the policies o f the government is the 
most immediate. But, if  strategy is revolutionary, then long term goal 
always becomes tlie immediate goal and short term considerations are 
achieved to the extent that long tenn goal is realized.^ ^
The classical communist parties who support a proletariat revolution; and 
separatist political parties or movements are cited in this group of oppositions. 
Because they are not satisfied with modification of the system and try to achieve a 
radical change. However, such parties tend to suppress the opposition, if it becomes 
able to hold the office alone. Because, its opposition is over basic principles, over the 
very foundations of the state and the nature of the regime. If the structural opposition 
parties accept the basic rules of the game, that is the rules of the competitive 
democracy, a moderating tendency can be created,-- that they may be permitted, by 
the power-holders of the existing political system, to compete for the power.
The structural oppositions who has the desire for a degree of goal displacement 
incompatible with the constitutional requirements of a given system are sometimes 
called as "the opposition of principle" or "the principled oppos i t i onas  against the 
pragmatism of the non-structural opposition.
Ibid., 13.
21 Ibid., 13.
22 Du verger, Parties, 420.
23 Kirchheimer, "The Wanishing," 237.
As for the non-striictiiral opposition, the goal is to change either the policy or 
the personnel of the government or both. Its program is compatible with the existing 
socio-economic structure and political regime. They are system-loyal political 
oppositions. In spite of failures and shortcomings of the existing political system, 
system-loyal opposition finds it better than any other than that might be established 
and therefore believe in its legitimacy.^^
Parliamentary & Non Parliamentary
In parliamentary democracies, political parties as political institutions seek to 
obtain political power and so all are potentially alternative government. Not 
considering the place of the opposition -in or outside the parliament- political parties 
check, control and criticize the government and introduce their own alternatives to the 
policies they oppose. They are the means of the alternation of the government. The 
situation of the opposition as an alternative government equates the parliamentary 
opposition with the political parties. For her, the goal, not the place of opposition, is 
decisive in the determination of the parliamentary opposition.-^
However, because of the limited scope of the study, we will confine the 
parliamentary opposition to the political parties who had been represented in the 
Parliament, but not participated in the formation of the government. Parliamentary 
opposition will mean us 'parties in the parliament'. In that case, it is, as Von Beyme 
explained: "Parliamentary opposition are those parliamentary groups which are strong 
enough to obtain the quorum necessary to entitle them to an independent 
parliamentary status".-®
Juan J. Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration," in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 
ed. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 16- 
17.
Turgut, Siyasal, 14-18.
-® Klaus Von Beyme, "Parliamentary Oppositions in Europe," in Opposition in Western Europe, ed. 
Eva Kolinsky (London and Sidney: Crom Helm, 1987), 30.
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When we difine parliamentary opposition, it also implies what is not 
parliamentary or what is non-parliamentary opposition. All oppositional forces that do 
not introduce themselves as government alternative and not compete for political 
power, are non-parliamentary oppositions. So, the political opposition of all non- 
parliamentary political parties, interest groups, public and private organizations, 
associations, organized or unorganized movements, is to be taken as non- 
parliamentary in this study.
Patterns o f Political Opposition
Robert Dahl distinguishes some ways which create variations in the oppositional 
acts of the political parties and serve differentiation of them from each other in 
different political systems and even within the same system.-'  ^ The characteristics of 
the political systems, stated below, determine the main patterns of oppositions.
Concentration
The concentration of an opposition is determined by looking at whether it is 
concentrated in a single organization or dispersed among different independent 
organizations.“* In that case, the number of political parties and internal unity of these 
parties are the two dimensions of concentration in the political systems. The lower the 
number of parties is, the higher the concentration of the opposition the system has. 
This is simply due to political party system. In two party systems, like Britain who 
has a tradition of "opposition with a capital O", the out party becomes the main agent 
of the opposition.“* This makes the opposition able to conduct more effective 
ppositional activities using the opportunities available to the opposition withouto
See Dahl, Western.
“** Ibicl.,340.
Allen Potter, "Opposition with a Capital 'O'," in Political Oppositions in western Democracies, eel. 
Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 13-16.
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confronting any legal or procedural problems, having an enough number in the 
parliament to conduct oppositional actions, like interpellation or vote of confidence. 
The existence of more parties would blockade the effectiveness of the opposition 
since it may lack the number demanded for being able to use the parliamentary 
opportunities. Still, if the internal cohesion of the opposition party is low, if it has 
different fractions, the opposition may get into trouble and lose effectiveness against 
the governing party or parties. It should be noted that there is no one to one 
connection between the cohesiveness party and the party system. While the two-party 
system in Britain has a strong cohesion, the US two-party system is less cohesive. On 
the other hand, the multi-party systems of Norway, Sweden and Netherlands indicate 
a high internal party unity contrary to the divided unity of Italian and French parties, 
excluding communist parties with high cohesion.
Competitiveness
Competition is a natural result of power struggle in a democratic system. 
Competitiveness of an opposition largely depends on the extent to which opposition is 
concentrated. Concentration of the opposition means, in terms of competitiveness, 
that losses of the government will be the gains of the opposition in a zero-sum 
relation.^' Since the seats in the parliament are fixed in number, they are captured by 
the opposition if lost by the government. The gains or losses of one party can be 
related to the losses or gains of other parties.^- This situation is the most explicit in 
the two party systems where opposition is concentrated. Two parties are in strict 
competitive relation since the gains of one will exactly equal to the losses of the other.
In the multi-party systems, strict competition is unlikely; in fact, unless one 
party can form a majority by itself, the strict competition is actually impossible unless
Dahl, Western, 335.
■5' Ibid., 336.
Smith, "Two Faces," 59-60.
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two parties are willing to enter into a coalition, no majority can be formed. Moreover, 
parties may not be strictly competitive even during elections, for they may enter into 
electoral alliances that limit the competition.^^ Still, parties are competitive during the 
elections, only, so as to increase their bargaining power in the resulting political table. 
They are cooperative in the legislation in order to turn every opportunity to the use 
for participating in a probable new coalition or for effecting the policies of the 
prevailing coalition.
The national and international conjecture, too, contribute to the behavior of the 
opposition. During the big internal crisis or war, the approach of the opposition tend 
to be coalescent. Throughout the major two world wars, the political parties in the 
Western Europe -France, Sweden, Austria, Britain- substituted collaboration for 
competition and formed coalitions agreeing on the postponement of elections until the 
end of the war. Although most of the coalitions were dissolved after the Second 
World War, some, for example in Austria, continued even long after.^“*
Site
Any opposition is to specify on what areas (sites) it will focus to bring about a 
change in the regime or in the policies and personnel of the government. Robert Dahl 
describes the sites as "the situation or circumstances in which an opposition employs 
its resources and calls them as sites for encounters between opposition and 
government".^^ The main sites are the public opinion, elections, parliament, 
bureaucracy, interest groups and process of coalition formation.
The decisiveness of these sites to determine government or process of decision­
making vary regarding to the structure of the political system. For Gordon Smith, 
elections and parliament have priority over the coalition processes and interest groups
Dahl, Western, 337.
Tuigut, Siyasal, 119-121. 
Dahl, Western, 338.
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and bureaucracy which would be very effective depending on its place in the 
system.Public opinion is very influential means in any democracy and its success in 
this site increases the chances to be effective in other sites. For example, by raising 
public opinion, a party can increase the votes in the elections and gains more seats in 
the parliament that in turn increases its chance to form the government or to take part 
in a possible coalition. In a parliament, which majority offers little opportunities to 
the opposition to effect the government decisions, the oppositions tend to turn to the 
public opinion for both exercising social pressure on government and increasing its 
chance in the next elections by appealing to the needs of the people who might be 
dissatisfied with some policies of the governments'^.
The decisiveness of the sites are closely related to the party system, simply the 
number of parties in the political system. In a two party system, winning the majority 
of seats in the parliament is the necessary and sufficient condition to bring about a 
change in the policies of the government. In that case, elections are decisive and 
opposition concentrate on gaining majority of the votes. Even the parliamentary 
activities are intended to influence the public opinion for the next elections rather than 
creating pressures on the government for policy changes.
Formation of the executive becomes decisive site in the multi-party systems 
where the parties are cohesive in the parliamentary voting. Political parties, knowing 
the impossibility of a single party government, try to take a part in the coalition and 
employ coalescent strategies.^*  ^ However, in some multi-party systems, like Sweden 
and Norway, participation in the coalition may not be enough to achieve policy 
changes because of the dispersion of the authority among several public, bureaucracy, 
and social organizations -trade unions, civil society organizations-. The policies are
Ciordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Coniparative Analysis (New York: Holmes Meier 
Publishers, 1973) 106, cited in Turgut, 5/yaia/. 65.
Turgut, Siyasal, 65-66.
Dahl, Western, 339.
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the result of bargaining between government agencies and major institutions that is 
called as the "two-tier system" in Norway.^^ The parties, whether in opposition or in 
power, are to be open to bargains, with public and social organizations, for policy 
determinations.
Distinctiveness
The identifiability of the opposition in the political system is the distinctiveness 
of the opposition that is the result of other characteristics, like concentration and 
competitiveness. In classical two-party system, where parties enjoy high internal 
unity, pursues competitive strategies on certain sites and the opposition can easily be 
distinguished from the government. So that, the opposition offers a real political 
alternative since there is a distinct division of functions between the majority 
(governing) and the minority (opposition) parties. Still, the solid and homogeneous 
coalitions of the political parties, operating in a multi-party system, may create a close 
resemblance to a two-party system and make the opposition more coherent and more 
distinct. On the other hand, a two-party system in which the parties are lacking of 
discipline, centralization and organization may have an opposition closer to the multi­
party than to the two-party model."*“
It is very difficult to determine who is the governing party and who is the 
opposition in the multi-party systems where the opposition is dispersed and employ 
coalescent strategies in the case of the impossibility of a single party government.“*' 
Further, the ambiguity increases in the multi-party systems if the majority party or the 
governing coalition has internal oppositions who, on certain occasions, may co-opt 
with the external opposition within the parliament.
wStein Rokkan, "Numerical Democracy," in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, eel. 
Robert Dahl fNew Haven: John Hopkins University Press, 1966), 107.
Du verger. Parties, 418.
Dahl, Western, 340-341.
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Goals & Strategies
The differentiation between the goals and strategies of the different oppositions 
is another determining factor on the nature of the opposition. The goals that an 
opposition want to achieve in the short or long term period, taking into consideration 
the socio-political conditions and constitutional settings of the country, also implies 
what strategies it would employ. The strategies may be competitive, coalescent, 
cooperative, conciliatory or revolutionary.“*r 42
Since competitive political systems exhibit differentiation, the chosen strategies 
which would bring the opposition to power are also different. In the British model of 
two party, the political system is under the monopoly of two unified parties, the only 
way to get the power is to win the majority of the parliament in the elections through 
pursuing a competitive strategy with a moderate stand in the parliament. Because, 
"the very conditions of political warfare which imply a certain alternation between the 
parties, and the possibility that today's opposition will tomorrow assume the sole 
responsibility of office, preserve it from any exaggerated demagogy which might 
react to its disadvantage".“**^ However, the out party maintains its distinctiveness in 
spite of moderation. That is to say, public opinion can grasp the difference between 
the points of view of the governing and the opposition parties, so can choose one, 
being aware of different policies competing for their votes.
In a multi-party system where the election itself is not determinant for obtaining 
power and coalition government is most probable, opposition parties pursue a strategy 
to participate in the formation of the coalition.“·“* For this, they prefer not a 
competitive, but a coalescent, cooperative strategy. Still, they are very demagogic and 
violent in their opposition, with unlimited criticisms and promises, fighting against
“*- Ibid., 344-346.
“*■* Du verger, Parties, 415. 
“*“* Turgut, Siyasal, 65-66.
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the nearest neighbor so as to oust the other that would elevate them to a critical 
position in the next parliament.**^
The intensity of the conflict will be higher in the parties representing a single 
social class and relatively homogeneous than a party representing several classes with 
divergent interests or a heterogeneous class. This tendency of the electoral conflict 
favors domination of the political system by the extremes, when the moderates 
pursues a competition strategy based on mutual rivalries and demagogic criticisms 
other than well-designed political alternatives.***’
The internal and external conditions are also important in the selection of the 
strategy to be employed. When the government and the opposition believe that the 
political entity is under the threat because of severe crisis, subversion, war etc. All 
oppositional groupings, mostly non revolutionary, commit to preserving the political 
entity agreeing to enter into a broader coalition for the duration of the crisis. Still they 
keep open the possibility of reverting to competition when the crisis has passed.**^
Because the main goal of the revolutionary parties is to replace the existing 
system with a new one through a radical change, they will try to increase the 
vulnerability of the political system in order to weaken it for the seizure of the 
power.**** Thus, the revolutionary opposition would choose any strategy -violent or 
nonviolent- to discredit the system decreasing its legitimacy that would increase the 
vulnerability.
**-”’ Dahl, Western, 339-340.
***’ Du verger, Parties, 415-416. 
**^ Tugut, Siyasal, 119-121.
*·** Dahl, Western, 346.
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CHAPTER II.
Political Opposition in Turkey:
Historical Background
The Turkish socio-economic and political culture did not exhibit a system 
favorable for the development of political opposition. The state system, economic 
structure and values and perceptions of society advocated a monocentrist political 
organization in which political opposition was not realizable.
If political opposition is defined as a mechanism which limits the government 
authority and produces alternatives to the program and personnel of the ruling body, it 
was not an initial part of the traditional political system in the Ottoman Empire.**^  The 
state system of the Empire was based on the domination of central authority which 
stemmed directly from the person of the Sultan which was the locus of power. 
Although the Sultan was limited, in principle, by the religious law ( Sheria ) and 
traditional expectations {adab ), his will and delegation used to be the only source of 
authority in the governmental mechanism.^*^
The civilian-military bureaucrats ( askeri class ) were the direct extensions of 
the Sultan's personal rule at the centre and in the periphery. The rest of the society 
(reaya) was isolated from the governing apparatus. Further, since the askeri class was 
reduced to the status of slave through a recruitment system ( devşirme), they would 
become in no position to oppose to the arbitrary rule of the Sultan.^' This endowed
Serif Mardin, "Türkiye'de Muhalefet ve Kontrol," in Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler 4, ed. M. 
Türköne and T. Önder (İstanbul: iletişim, 1994), 179.
see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey ( The Eothen Press, 1985 ).
Ergim Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey," in Political Culture 
and Deniocracy in Developini> Countries, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 247- 
248.
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the Empire with a centrally controlled bureaucratic nature that became the main 
obstacle before the establishment of representative institutions^^ which would pave 
the way to the evolution of oppositional movements or groupings at the centre and in 
the periphery to the existing political system and/or policies.
The economic structure was not more favorable. The land tenure system {timai) 
of the Empire did not permit establishment of European-like feudalism. Every process 
of economic life was controlled by the centrally appointed bureaucracy in a 
patrimonial relationship that avoided emergence of aristocratic and wealthy local 
leaders who would initiate an opposition to the arbitrary rule of the Sultan^^. Still, 
whenever the central authority weakened, the strong local personalities tended to 
strengthen their positions vis-à-vis the Sultan's central rule. But, they never sought an 
independent political status producing an alternative to the political system of the 
centre. Instead, they established horizontal links with the central bureaucracy^^* that 
helped the Sultan to sustain his hegemony in the governmental apparatus.
The monocentrist nature of the classical political system of the Ottoman Empire 
was defined as:
Witli no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary 
aristocracy, no autonomous church organization, no strong merchant class 
or artisan guilds, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution ( i. 
e. the administration and the army ) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman 
Empire represented a close approximation o f an Oriental Despotism.
On the other hand, despite the fact that organization of society in the Empire 
approached to a multicultural structure with its community life based on religious
Ergun Özbudun, "Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in Politics in Developing Countries: 
Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (Boulder and 
Colorado: Reinner Publishers, 1990), 177.
Çağlar Keyder, Türkiye'de Devlet ve Siniflar (Istanbul: iletişim, 1993), 15-18.
Heper, State, 22, 32-33.
Özbudun, "Interruptions," 177,
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affiliations ( millet system ), it also contributed to the difficulties of political 
opposition in the Empire. The auto-control mechanisms, the fear of fitne 
(deviation)was one of them, avoided emergence of a plural civil society which would 
counterweight the power of the state. So, as of the state, the society also displayed 
intolerant attitudes toward the deviations from the established rules of the existing 
system. The fitne was perceived to be a threat to the healthy working of the 
community mechanisms which met many socio-economic and political needs of 
people in the absence of intermediary civil society organizations.^^ In that case, the 
society tended to preserve its apolitical structure in the true sense of subjects ( kiil) of 
the governing authority, namely of the Sultan.
The fear of //toe turned to the fear of'secession' and 'division' at the state level. 
The oppositional movements and sections used to be seen as secessionist ( ayrilikgi )  
to the unity of country and divisive to the harmonious structure of the society. Any 
opposition to the regime and/or policies and personnel of the government was treated 
by the governing authorities to be a treason to the existence of the state. For Mardin, 
this view of the authority functioned as a rational ground for the suppression of 
possible oppositions. '^^
A political system is likely to permit opposition if the government believes that 
an attempt to coerce the opposition is likely to fail or if the attempt were to succeed, 
the costs of coercion would exceed the gains.^^ Since the state monopolized all 
military, political as well as economic power in its hands, with a static society 
intolerant to changes, the classical Ottoman State was neither ready nor vulnerable to 
open the way for the oppositional activities. All embracing mling system of the centre 
was able to suppress any oppositional group or movement through either coercion or
Mardin, "Muhalefet," 187-189.
Ibid., 189, see also Kurtuluş Kayali, "Hürriyet ve itilaf Firkasi" in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. .5 (İstanbul: iletişim, 1985), 1436-1444.
Dahi, Western, 14.
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persuasion as long as it maintained holding socio-economic and political structures in 
its control.
However, the transformation in Europe, which took place since 16th Century, 
hit first the traditional military and then economic and administrative system of the 
Empire. So that, in order to stop the decline of the State before the Western Powers, it 
initiated a process of modernization, by 18th century, spreading its effects to the 
social life as well. The reforms transformed classical structures of the basic 
institutions of the Empire, including administration, military, economy and 
education.
In order to save the state, the bureaucrats and intellectuals of the Ottoman State 
introduced alternative political systems and policies which were adopted from the 
Western models as well as traditional institutions of the Empire. During this process, 
the views of the Western educated bureaucrats gained more initiative by the 19th 
century. Under the influence of European political currents and state systems, they 
sought for the establishment of a constitutionalist parliamentary system. The Young 
Ottomans, the leading group of constitutionalist opposition, succeeded in 
proclamation of the Constitution and convening of the first Ottoman Parliament in 
1876.^ ’*' However, in the absence of a favorable political culture as well as a legal 
structure so as to secure the place of a parliamentary system against the possible 
absolutist tendencies of the Sultan, the parliament was dissolved and the constitution 
was suspended by the Sultan in 1877.
Keycler, Siniflar, 23-38. See Serif Mardin "Türk Siyasasini Aciklayabilecek Bir Anahtar; Merkez- 
Cevre ilişkileri," in Şerif Mardin: Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset, eds. M. Türküne and T. Önder, 39- 
66. ( İstanbul; iletişim, 1991 ).
For the political views and opposition attempts of the Young Ottomans see. Serif Mardin, The 
Genesis of Yoimp Ottoman Thouaht (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1962). Nükhet Turgut, 
Siyasal Muhalefet (Ankara; Birey-Toplum, 1984). Enver Koray, "Yeni Osmanlilar," in 150. Yilinda 
Tanzimat, ed. H. Dursun Yildiz (Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1992), 547-567.
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Although the first experience of parliamentary opposition in Turkish politics 
failed, it was a turning point for the development of a parliamentary system to limit 
the absolute power of the Sultan. In this sense, the restoration of the constitutionalist 
system was to be the main goal of the Young Turks in their opposition to the 
autocratic rule of Sultan AbdiUhamid II. that culminated in the restoration of the 
constitutionalist parliamentary system in 1 9 0 8 .However, soon after the reopening 
of the parliament, the attitudes of the power holders taken toward the competitive 
politics continued to poison the healthy development of political opposition in 
Turkish politics. Despite the parliament involved, for the first time, a political party 
opposition which was represented first by the Liberal Party {LP-AIirar Firkasi) and 
then by the Liberal Union {Uü-Hürriyet ve itila f Firkasi) against the majority rule of 
the Community of Union and Progress {C\J?-lttibat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), it was not 
in a position to perform the functions expected from a political opposition. The 
opposition aimed at ousting the government regardless of what strategy would be 
employed rather than checking, balancing the power of the governmental authority as 
producing alternative policies to those of government. On the other hand, perceiving 
the power as absolute, the CUP government used to see the opposition as an obstacle 
before the implementation of the best policies for the good of the state. ’^- So, the 
competitive politics of Second Constitutionalist regime degenerated into a 'politics of 
outbidding' that ended with the single-party authoritarian rule of the CUP as early as 
1913.
For the policies and strategies of Young Turk opposition see, Şükrü Hanioglu, The Young Turks in 
Oiyposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Sina Aksin, Jön Türkler ve ittihat ve Terakki 
(İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987).
For the government-opposition relations of the Second Constitutionalist period see. Tarik Zafer 
Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler: ikinci Mesturitiyet Dönemi (1908-1918) (İstanbul: Hürriyet 
Vakfi Yayinlari, 1988). Feroz Ahmad, Ittihad ve Terakki: I908-I9I4 (İstanbul: Sander, 1971), trans, 
by Nuran Ülken. Ahmed Hilmi (Sehberdenderzade Filibeli), Muhalafetin Iflasi: itilaf ve Hürriyet 
Firkasi (İstanbul: Nehir Yayinlari, 1991), first published in 1331 under the same name. Sina Aksin, 
"Ittihad ve Terakki," in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi Vol. 5 (Istanbul: iletisini, 
1985), 1422-1435. Kurtuluş Kayali, "Hürriyet ve itilaf Firkasi," in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 5 (Istanbul: iletişim, 1985), 1436-1444.
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Following the First World War (1914-1918), the Turkish Liberation War resulted in 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Republic inherited an 
intolerant political culture for the political opposition as well as an institution of 
political opposition which tended, on occasions, not to recognize the legitimacy of 
government and ready to defect toward non-constitutionality in its competitive 
strategy. The office-oriented struggles had weighted the program-based competition 
in oppositional attempts that led to transformation of the competitive politics into a 
'war of political parties' in which conspiracy attempts played a prominent role. For 
this reason, the progressive wing of the nationalist leaders most of whom were ex- 
Unionists, headed by Mustafa Kemal, tended to see the political opposition as a 
counter revolutionary structural challenge to their imminent secular, nationalist, 
republican regime based on the sovereignty of people. So, even anti-Republican 
Peoples Party (RPP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), anti-authoritarian policy opposition of 
the Second Group of the First Parliament (1922-1923), the Progressive Republican 
Party (1924-1925) and the Republican Free Party (1930) were easily related with the 
anti-system, non-constitutional goals and strategies. The opposition to the governing 
party was taken as equivalent to opposition to the state as such making every member 
of the opposition an enemy of the state, as a traitor that became instrumental in 
suppressing these opposition struggles.^^
Being aware of the social unrest stemming from the radical social reforms as well as 
economic crisis, the leaders of the single-party authoritarian regime of the Republican
For the situation of political opposition in the early Republican period see, Ahmet Demirel, Birinci 
Mecliste Muhalefet: ikinci Grup (Istanbul: iletişim, 1994). Kurtuluş Kayali,"!. TBMM'de 
Muhalefet," in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 8 (İstanbul: iletişim), 1161-1167, 
Mete Tuncay, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulmasi: 1923-1931 (Ankara: Yurt, 1981). Esat 
Öz, Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katilim (Ankara: Gündogan, 1992). Erik J. Zurcher, 
Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party (Leiden, 
Kobenhavn, Koln and New York: E.J. Brill, 1991). Walter F. Weiker, Political Tutelage and 
Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973). Feroz Ahmad, 
"Piogressive Republican Party," in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and 
Jacop M. Landau (London and New York: St. Martin Press, 1991), 65-80. Tevfik Çavdar, "Serbest 
Firka," in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 8 (Istanbul: iletişim), 2052-2059.
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period became cautious about any political opposition which would endanger the 
healthy institutionalization of the Republican reforms. In that case, although the 1924 
Constitution foreseen a liberal political system which would fully observe the national 
sovereignty, it was postponed under the assumption that the Turkish people were not 
yet ready to rule themselves.
The time seemed to be ripe, for the moderate leaders of the single-party regime, to 
permit political opposition when Turkey confronted with changing external and 
internal balances after the Second World War. Against the Russian threat within the 
bipolarity of the world, Turkey needed to further approach to the Western block 
where competitive democratic regimes had been widely accepted. Besides, the war­
time economic conditions which worked for the good of landed and merchant classes 
as it deteriorated the life standards of the lower and fixed income groups that heavily 
hit the social inequalities increasing the social unrest in the country. The resulting 
dissatisfaction with the single-party regime and policies created disturbance not only 
among the society but also within the cadres of the RPP itself. It had become clear 
that the costs of continuation of an authoritarian regime would be higher. On the other 
hand, the consensus among political elites on the basic principles of the Republic was 
another incentive to permit, at least, political opposition of the system-loyal groups. 
The structural, anti-system opposition would not yet be permitted.^“*
Since the transition to a competitive political system where political opposition could 
function, had been based on the isolation of the structural opposition groups, all anti- 
RPP opposition concentrated under the roof of the Democrat Party (DP) established
For the incentives and process of the establishment of multi-party rule in Turkey see Kemal H. 
Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 19.59). Cem Erogul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1946-1971," in Turkey in 
'Transition: New Perspectives, ed. Irvin Cemil Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 101-143. Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (Ankara: 
imge Kitabevi, 1990). Ahmet Emin Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," 
'The Middle East Journal. 1 (1947), 46-58.
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by the prominent members of the RPP's single party years. This meant that the ruling 
RPP was to be confronted by a strong and very competitive opposition.
Although the DP obtained a weak representation in the parliament with 1946 
elections, it posed a strong opposition against the anti-democratic rules and 
applications inherited from the single-party regime. The massive social support 
behind the anti-RPP opposition pushed the DP to focus on the public opinion as a site 
of its attempts. The strategy of the DP opposition was to criticize the RPP on every 
occasion. This strategy was so effective that the RPP had become to consider the 
libertarian claims of the opposition on the nature of the political system. Anti­
democratic regulations of the single-party years, like indirect elections, restrictions on 
press, associational rights, broadcasting sided with government, were amended one by 
one between 1946 and 1950 that made the DP opposition an equal partner of the 
political system.*’^
The DP carried on a regime-oriented opposition insisting on the liberalization of 
political system rather than launching a program-based struggle. The system 
considerations of the opposition curtailed socio-economic alternatives produced by 
the DP against the policies of the government. Meanwhile, although the struggle led 
to occasional polarization between government and opposition in a true nature of 
zero-sum competition of the two party system, it was eased by the structural 
concessions of the RPP with the intention to give an end to the single-party 
authoritarian regime. In contrast to previous experiences, it did not go to suppression 
of the political opposition even when the increasing social support behind the DP 
threatened its status in the parliament as well as in the political system.
See Karpat, Turkey's Politics;. Erogul, Democrat Parti, and "The Establishment,"; M. Ali Birand, 
Can Dündar and Bülent Çapli, Demirkirat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğusu (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 
1991).
l'or the opposition behavior of the DP see, Karpat, Turkey's Politics,. Erogul, Democrat Parti,. 
Birand, Demirkirat,. Tevfik Çavdar, "Demokrat Parti," in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 
Vol. 8 (Istanbul: iletişim), 2060-2075.
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During the DP opposition, the policies of both opposition and government became 
supportive for a competitive democracy. Neither the DP tended to employ stmctural, 
non-constitutional goals and strategies, nor the RPP government defected toward 
authoritarianism. Those advocated liberalization of the political system weighted the 
authoritarian tendencies within the RPP.
The RPP delivered the power to the DP in 1950 elections which was held under the 
newly implemented democratic regulations. It was the first time in Turkish politics 
that the ruling party peacefully transferred the power to its opponent pertinent to 
democratic procedures. However, since the political system could not develop 
appropriate understandings on the way of political opposition as well as the attitudes 
of governments held toward political oppositions, the government-opposition 
relations eventually degenerated into a struggle of survival throughout the 1950s.^ ’^
Unwilling to leave the power, the DP lost its tolerance to the criticisms of the 
opposition, by the mid-1950s, when it began to lose public support because of 
economic problems.^*  ^Although, it was the champion of the libertarian claims when it 
was in opposition, steadily increasing power of the opposition in and out of the 
parliament, pushed the DP to depend more on authoritarian policies. It restricted the 
voice of the opposition not only in the parliament but also out of the parliament. Now 
the champion of liberalism was the RPP opposition. But, the DP, claiming on the 
absolute sovereignty of the 'national will', which had been perceived to be represented 
by the majority of the parliament, tended not to give a way for the libertarian 
demands of the opposition. Instead, it strengthened authoritarian policies toward the 
end of 1950s that was claimed to be a coup d'état launched by the DP government 
toward the opposition in order to establish a single-party rule. In that sense, the 1960
67 liter Turan, "Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Oluşumu," in Türk Siyasal Hayatinin Gelişimi, eds. 
Ersin Kalaycioglu and Ali Yasar Saribciy, 461-491 (İstanbul; Beta Basim, 1986).
For the effects of economic crisis on the authoritarian defection of the DP see, İlkay Sunar, 
"Demokrat Parti ve Populism," in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Yol. 8 (İstanbul: 
İletişim). 2076-2086.
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military intervention was interpreted as a countercoup rather than a coup made by the 
military/’^
Since the opposition, which had concentrated in the RPP, was in a struggle for 
survival against the authoritarianism of the government, it had to stress on the 
constitutional amendments which would check the authoritarian defection of the 
ruling party. So, the opposition focused on the regime considerations in which its 
alternative socio-economic policy designs disappeared. In this sense, the opposition 
period of the RPP was important that it revealed deficiencies of the existing 
competitive political system. The regime-oriented policy formulations of the RPP, 
declared in its General Congress of 1959 as the 'Memorandum of First Targets', 
outlined the shortcomings of Turkish democracy in 1950s. The post 1960 regime was 
to bring parliamentary and non-parliamentary mechanisms so as to secure the 
existence of political opposition in Turkish political life.
Erogul, "The Establishment," 118. For the views of Cemal Madanoglu, who was one of the leaders 
of the Coup, see Birand, Demirkirat, 165-166.
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CHAPTER III.
Parliamentary Opposition: 1961-1971
During the period between 1961 and 1965, the political system experienced a 
process for the institutionalization of the mechanisms introduced by the transitory 
military regime. So, the founders of the new political structure became careful about 
the healthy development of the system that sustained the military existence in the 
civilian politics. In that case, the politicians could not act as like they would do 
otherwise. The Turkish politics could realize the plural nature of the post-1960 
political and legal structure only toward and after the 1965 elections. That is why, this 
chapter was divided into two: First, 'the years of shaky opposition' which covered the 
period between 1961 and 1965, and the second, the 'plurality in opposition' of the 
1965-1971 period.
Years of "Shaky Opposition": 1961-1965
The place of political opposition in Turkish competitive politics experienced a 
process of crisis in its institutionalization. The political culture, economic system as 
well as legal structure were not tolerant for the development of peaceful 
accommodation between political alternatives. That is why, under the impact of 
monocentrist political experiences, the Turkish political authorities tended to see the 
political opposition to their policies or personnel as equivalent to anti-system 
opposition. The program-oriented loyal opposition was assumed to be structural in its 
claims. In that case, since the legal structure was hardly constrained the actions of the 
government, political stmggle in a competitive ground eventually became impossible.
It demonstrated a vicious circle in which competitive political systems ended with
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authoritarian regimes. The political movements which defended libertarian claims 
turned to be authoritarian once they were in pow er.Even the peaceful alternation of 
political power, in 1950, could not help establishment of competitive political system 
where political opposition would perform its functions without the fear of 
governmental authoritarianism. So that, the continuation of intolerant attitudes in the 
political authorities toward the criticisms of alternative political bodies culminated in 
a single-party-like rule of the DP toward the ends of the 1950s that ended with the 
military intervention in 1960.
The authoritarian defection of the DP was the main cause of the intervention. 
Not only it had endangered the competitive political system established in 1945, but 
also had disturbed the social peace at the elite as well as the mass level. The 
bureaucratic and military elites needed to intervene the politics since they felt that the 
country's best interests are being inflicted by the authoritarian policies of the DP 
government."^* The uncompromising appeal of the DP, depending on its obvious 
majority in the parliament which had been vested with the absolute power by the 1924 
Constitution, against the parliamentary opposition reached to a peak with the 
establishment of a Parliamentary Investigation Committee, in April 1960. The 
intention was to control all intra-parliamentary as well as non-parliamentary activities 
of the opposition in order to silence it. A peaceful accommodation between the 
political actors of the government and the opposition had become impossible.
Since the military elites considered democracy as an intellectual debate with the 
intention of determining the best policy and not as an effort to reconcile and 
aggregate different views and in terests,the aim of the Coup was to extricate the
İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," in Transition From 
Authoritarian Rule, eds. G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead ( Maryland: .iohns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 172.
Metin Heper, "Introduction" in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and 
.lacop M. Landau ( London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991 ), 3.
Heper, "Introduction," 4.
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politicians from the irreconcilable situation in which they had fallen. In that sense, 
stressing on the transitory nature of the military intervention, the military 
personalities did not reject democracy, but the operation of the Turkish democracy 
with its ill-designed institutions on which the parliamentary opposition of the 
previous decade had been carrying out a strong campaign. They assured that the 
administration would be hand over to the political party which won the election to be 
held as soon as the restoration of the Turkish democratic system that was to correct 
the shortcomings of the previous years, was finished.’^
The National Unity Committee (NUC-M/7// Birlik Komitesif·^ considered that 
the DP had come to power legally, but legality of the government laid not in its 
origins but in its respect for the Constitution and for such institutions as press, the 
military and the universities.·^  ^ However, it had imposed limitations on the voice of 
opposition, both in and out of the Parliament. For the restoration of democratic 
system, a new constitution and electoral law should have been prepared so as to 
guarantee the competitive nature of democracy in Turkey.
The post-intervention political life was dominated by the pre-1960 opposition, 
predominantly by the RPP and its sympathizers in bureaucracy and professional 
organizations.·^^’ So, it tended to reflect the socio-economic assumptions and regime 
formulations of the previous political opposition.^’ What it could not realize in the 
DP-dominated pre-1960 political system, was taken into the political and legal 
structure during the preparation of the 1961 Constitution.
Feroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modern Turkey ( London and New York: Routhledge, 1993 ), 126.
’ * The NUC included the leading commands of the Coup under the leadership of Cemal Gürsel who 
had come out to be the leader by the early hours of the intervention.
Ibid., 127.
Tevfik Çavdar, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi" in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi. Vol.8 ( 
İstanbul: iletişim ), 2030-2031.
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The 1961 Constitution was prepared under the effects of adverse experiences of 
the previous Constitution. In 1924, the desire was to give the parliamentary majority 
free reign in order to create a strong executive for the implementation of the reforms 
which were to transform a political system as well as a traditional society. Further, 
any limitation on the majority would mean the limitation of the national sovereignty 
which was the source of legitimacy on which the Republic had been established.''« 
However, in 1960, the principal concern was to curb the power of the majority for the 
democratization of the political system in which the political opposition can survive 
so as to check the power of the government. For this, the executive authority was 
divided among administrative institutions and the power of the legislative was 
restricted by the establishment of a strict judicial control. The Constitutional Court 
was designed in order to prevent the government from arbitrary actions. So that, the 
1961 Constitution institutionalized the bureaucratic and the military control over 
elected politicians in the sense that unlike the 1924 Assembly which had been vested 
with the representation of national sovereignty without any limitation, the 1961 
Constitution preserved the national sovereignty in principle, but it would be exercised 
not only through the parliament but also through the authorized agencies as it 
prescribed by the principles laid down in the new Constitution.’*-' Since it constrained 
the actions of the political power, this political structure was to be called later by 
Siileyman Demirel, the leader of the .IP, as 'government by many' and complained that 
with such a constitution it was impossible to govern.«" In fact, the political power had 
been so dispersed that obtaining the majority in the parliament came to be not enough 
on itself to govern. The considerations of the civilian-military state elites became also 
vital in the policy-making process of the government that multiplied the mechanisms 
in the hands of the parliamentary opposition to be used against the government.
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The 1961 Constitution materialized most of the objectives designed by the 
opposition front of the second half of the 1950s that had been declared by the RPP 
Congress of 1959 as the 'Manifesto of the Primary Targets'. It had sought security 
guarantees for elections, establishment of a second parliamentary chamber, of 
supreme court of justice, and of a Constitutional Court which was to review the 
constitutionality of legislation, autonomy for universities, adaptation of proportional 
representation in the electoral system, constitutional guarantee of the freedom of 
press, inclusion of the principle of social justice into the constitution.**‘ Further, the 
Constitution gave a role to the military in the government through National Security 
Council. Its function was to assist the cabinet in the making of decisions related to 
national security and coordination. However, since the limits of the national security 
is not well defined but all embracing, the military personalities would found a say in 
every measure of the government.**  ^ It would play even a mediating role between the 
political parties imposing a superficial consensus among them in order to avoid a 
uncompromising tendencies between government and opposition. Moreover, the 
economic matters were related to a central planning through the establishment of the 
State Planning Organization (SPO) which was to designate a balanced and sustainable 
economic growth that decreased authority of governments on the economy.
More importantly, the 1961 Constitution, for the first time, institutionalized the 
position and the status of the political opposition in Turkish politics rendering it as 
"the indispensable element of democratic political life." The political opposition 
acquired constitutional securities against the possible authoritarian policies of the 
majority party. In contrast to the previous constitutions which did not mention about 
this question, the Articles 56 and 57 of the new document accepted political parties 
as:
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the indespesible entities o f democratic life. Citizens were entitled with 
broad rights to establish political parties and to join and to withdraw from 
them pursuing appropriate rules and procedures. Political parties could be 
founded without prior permission and would operate freely.
obey:
Moreover, it underlined the general principles to which political parties had to
The statutes, programs, and activities of the political parties shall 
conform to the principles of democratic, secular republic, based on 
human rights and liberties and to the fundamental principals of the state's 
territorial and national integrity. Parties failing to conform to these 
provisions would be permanently dissolved. Political parties would 
account for their sources of income and expenditures to the Constitutional 
Court.
Further, the dissolution process of the parties has been placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court:
Actions in law involving the dissolution of political parties shall be heard 
by the Constitutional Court and the verdict to dissolve them shall be 
rendered only by this court'.
Recalling the dissolution of the parties of political opposition in the 1950's and 
before, that had depended on the whim of the ruling political party, the forgers of the 
new Constitution had specified the reason for which a party could be dissolved.^^’ The 
dissolution of political party turned to be a legal process rather than a political 
struggle. In that case, it is expected that the political opposition would perform its full 
functions by the resumption of competitive political system. However, the difficulties
Turkish Constitution 1961, Article 56. 
Turkish Constitution 1961, Article 57. 
Turkish Constitution 1961, Article 57. 
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stemming from the continuation of the military impact on the civilian politics tended 
to constraint the limits of opposition in the new system.
With the restoration of competitive politics by February 1961, after the 
establishment of a new legal and political structure, the inheritance of the outlawed 
DP votes and organization led to a competition between various political parties. Of 
those, the .lustice Party (JP), which was founded in February 1961, was more likely to 
succeed the DP and be able to use the DP organization nationwide as soon as it was 
founded. The Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) and the New Turkey Party 
(NTP) were to prove their incapability in this competition.
The .TP largely succeeded in reclaiming the former power of the DP, as it was 
first evidenced by the referendum held for the new Constitution in 1961. Through a 
covert propaganda, it had supported the rejection of the new Constitution and the fact 
was that almost 40 per cent of the participants voted in this manner indicating the 
strength gained by this party founded nine months earlier.**’ It began to obtain the 
support of a large part of the population from its establishment.
In the way to power, the .IP, as a mass party, represented different and 
sometimes contradictory interests and aggregated them into policy packages 
acceptable as many people as possible. So, it claimed representation of all classes 
maintaining DP conservatism in social representation. It tended to defend the DP's 
liberal policies, although claimed, under the constraints of the new Constitution which 
defined the Republic as a 'social state', and advocated mixed policies in the economic 
sphere. However, social justice, for them, did not mean equality in poverty, hostility 
to capital or equal distribution of income. The way to achieve social justice did not 
pass through class-struggle, but through a real increase in the national income for 
which it was necessary to have economic growth first. The JP accorded an important
**’ Erogul, "The Establishment," 122
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role to the private sector in this economic development strategy. Its liberal anti- 
etatism was stronger than that of the DP. The party program honored with the 
ownership rights and considered the private sector and free economy as indispensable 
for a democratic regime. The program, also, stated that the public sector ends where 
private sector begins. Further, it rejected nationalization and even called for the sale 
of the state economic enterprises*^ **. It followed a pragmatic policy in its appeal to the 
social structure of Turkey. In addition to the big bourgeois circles, the .IP's greatest 
support came from small-holder peasants, who were emerging from poverty and a 
subsistence way of life; and small commercial, industrial, urban labor groups and 
newly wealthy farmers. These groups represented the rising social groups in 
competition with an older civil-bureaucratic elite in the centre and the local notables 
in the periphery who were used to be represented by the RPP.**^  The .IP prepared 
itself, with its program, to defense the interests which were disturbed with the 
envisaged etatist policies advocated by the RPP and the 1961 Constitution. So, it 
posed an opposition, from the beginning, to the socio-economic policies of the RPP 
who was to dominate the post-intervention civilian politics.
On the other hand, the RPP remained to be the political organization of the 
older elites, mainly the civilian bureaucratic groups, that came to dominate the latter 
phases of the Ottoman Empire and early years of the Republic, including the military 
officers, urban intellectuals and landed notables in the countryside.* '^* So, coming to 
early 1960s, it continued to be identified with the state, prevailing the image of 
monoparty years. The principles of these years, like strict secularism, populism, and 
etatism represented the essence of the party which had been headed by a 'man of 
state', ismet İnönü. Since the RPP was equated with the state to which the military 
was a loyal watchdog***, it was the only major party who had been permitted to
**** Levi, "The .lustice Party," 140-41.
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function even after the military intervention of 'May 27' and, as it was mentioned 
above, played important roles in the restructuration of the Turkish democracy under 
the auspices of the military leaders in the early 1960s. Due to this fact, the 
"circumstances following the military intervention had led skeptics to suggest that the 
only way the party could stage a comeback was with the help of the military, rather 
than the free choice of the electorate".^-
The free elections was held on October 1961 in which new electoral law with a 
proportional representation was applied. In the absence of an effective opposition, the 
expectation was that it would give the RPP a comfortable majority enough to form the 
government in the Parliament so as to enforce the reforms of the new Constitution. 
But, it did not go as planned.^^ The inheritors of the DP, the .IP and the NTP obtained 
about the majority of the votes cast as the RPP did not poll much better than the 
scores of the 1950s. The RPNP, which was famous with its religious orientation, also 
won a rate enough to have representation in the Parliament.^ "^* The results were 
elaborated as a tribute to the power Adnan Menderes continued to exercise from the 
grave and a vote of refusal against the military regime which had ousted him.‘^^
The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) contained four parties^^, but it 
did not much disturb the domination of the two-party system in Turkish politics. So, 
the Parliament tended to exhibit competition of the previous decade that was now 
between etatist-secularist policies of the RPP and the liberal, centre right policies of
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the JP. However, since the place of the political opposition in the political system was 
secured by the Constitution and the government has to share the political power with 
military-bureaucratic institutions, neither it was possible for the government to defect 
toward authoritarianism nor would the opposition have to focus on the regime 
oriented struggles with the aim to eliminate the governmental threats. The 
parliamentary opposition would, now, turn to its essential function which is to check 
and balance the policies of the government, in the Parliament, as producing socio­
economic policies to those of government, in order to obtain the majority in the next 
election. However, since the military existence in the civilian policies was heavily felt 
during the early years of 1960s, the opposition was not able to produce alternative 
policies that it would do otherwise.
Given the results of the 1961 parliamentary elections, the most satisfactory 
coalition might have been between the JP and NTP who held similar programs and 
having the appropriate number of seats in the TGNA able to form a coalition 
government 1137 and 65 respectively). However, such a coalition would allow the JP 
to create a powerful image of itself as the main opposition party.^ "^  Because, although 
the party system was more fragmented regarding the previous decade due to the 
application of PR system which had rewarded the minor parties, it was obviously seen 
that the opposition tended to concentrate under the roof of the JP as it gained strength 
against oppressive policies of the NUC towards the ex-DP successors. On the other 
hand, it had become fairly clear during this period that the armed forces would not 
tolerate any coalition that would exclude the RPP who used to be seen by the state 
elites as the safeguard of the basic principles of the Republic and was the only trusted 
political institution to enforce the reforms envisaged by the Constitution, in addition 
to the position of İnönü in the eyes of the military leaders.^ *^  As there was no question 
of permitting a neo-democrat coalition to form the government that would have
C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy ( The Eothen Press, 1990 ), 56. 
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invited another intervention by the military, the President Cemal Gürsel asked İsmet 
İnönü, the leader of the RPP, to do so.
Although there was no party in the Parliament to collaborate with İnönü at the 
beginning, soon military pressures persuaded even extreme Democrats to establish a 
coalition with the RPP during the 'Comfort Meetings' {Huzur Toplantilari) which 
brought the political party leaders together in the Presidential Palace. The 'Meetings' 
were to be repeated throughout the first half of the 1960s in order to secure a political 
system expected by the military. It seems to be that, the main target of the .IP-RPP 
coalition aimed at preventing a stronger parliamentary opposition against the policies 
to be implemented by the RPP.^  ^Beside this, the political party leaders had become to 
declare, in the first 'Comfort Meeting', their loyalty to the military intervention and 
the 1961 Constitution. Obviously, the limits of the opposition was determined in 
advance that any political opposition, who would threaten the position of the military 
and the system it established, would not be permitted. The degree of the military 
existence in the politics tended to draw the borders of opposition, even in the 
Parliament.
The first coalition of the Republican history was formed on November 1961 and 
lasted about seven months. In fact, the liberal NTP and conservative RPNP were the 
opposition in the Parliament, but the real opposition to the government policies came 
from the reluctant partner, the .IP, from within the coalition government. Because, the 
main concern, which laid in the essence of the party was to achieve an amnesty for 
the arrested ex-Democrats that contradicted with what social basis and state elites 
expected from the RPP. Further, many .TP members, basically those of extremists, 
suspected İnönü of collaborating with the military·® .^ However, an amnesty was not 
possible under the close monitoring of the military leaders who were cautious about a
Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History ( London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993 ), 261. He 
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democratic revenge. İnönü made good use of a possible military intervention against 
both intra government and parliamentary opposition and succeeded in suppressing the 
attacks of the extremist Democrats. The failure of the Aydemir's coup attempts in 
February 1962, further strengthened the position of the premier İnönü vis-à-vis the 
opposition. Upon the failure of this coup, İnönü was met in the TGNA like a hero 
even by the opposition parties. Simply due to the fact that the .IP's intra-government 
opposition was regarded as the cause of the a t te m p t,th e  political parties had 
become to redeclare their loyalties to the Intervention with a new Comfort Meeting. 
Still, the amnesty question became the only issue on which the .IP could dare to 
oppose both to the RPP and the military.'“-
It is asserted that İnönü had permitted the coup attempt of Aydemir in order to 
secure his position in the government and in the Parliament, and to have a strong 
stand against the demands of the opposition.*“^  The resulting shadow of the military 
over politicians helped İnönü to create a "very loyal opposition" in the parliament.
However, the amnesty question which raised political crisis both among 
coalition partners and between politicians and military leaders, curtailed the real 
differentiation between the RPP and the .IP on the socio-economic issues such as 
'social state', 'land reform', 'labor rights', the role of the private sectors and, to some 
extent, the role of the central planning in economy that all had been laid down by the 
new Constitution. In order to be able to deal with such reforms, İnönü frequently 
warned the opposition to accept the necessary condition by giving a way the intra­
government opposition which had been attributed to be a vote catching attempt. İnönü 
gave priority to the general socio-economic problems of the country over an amnesty 
which would be held on when the situation became more appropriate. But, the .IP,
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which was still in search of the adherence of the DP, rejected to give any concession 
from its basic considerations about the ex-Democrafs question as well as socio­
economic programs. The end of the coalition came when the .IP attempted to attach 
the pardon of the Aydemir Incident's rebels to the ex-Democrats' amnesty, upon 
which the Chief of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay, once again, resorted a pressure 
that persuaded both the .TP and NTP to vote for pardon which was to retire the 
considered personalities from the military. But this increased the disturbance within 
the .IP. The extremists demanded to withdraw not only from the cabinet, but also from 
the Assembly. Seeing that there was no hope of agreement, the government resigned 
(30 May 1962).
Since the .IP felt the pressure of the military always on itself, it could not behave 
as it would do otherwise. The ,TP leaders, confronted with a military threat, had 
followed pragmatic policies in order not to irritate High Commands of the military.
However, it seemed to be impossible to reformulate another coalition without 
the appearance of the military. So, İnönü on the authorization to establish the 
coalition met with the president Gürsel and Chief of the Staff, Sunay, on 19 .Tune. 
The other day all political party leaders were invited to the President's Palace, again 
for a 'Comfort Meeting', and a formulation of the coalition was imposed consisting of 
all political parties, leaving the JP in the opposition. The RPP established the second 
coalition, in .lune 1962, with the NTP, the RPNP and independents. For the minor 
opposition parties, this would be an opportunity to achieve their programs within the 
limitations set by the military.
Under the impact of the policies of the smaller partners, the coalition protocol 
accepted the private sector as an equal partner in the economic sphere. The leader of 
the NTP, Ekrem Alican, who favored free enterprise was given the responsibility of
Levi, "The .lustice Party," 60.
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economic affairs including the control of the State Planning Organization. In 
September 1962, the coalition allowed fifty five landed notables to return to Eastern 
Anatolia from where they had been exiled by the NUC, thus eliminating all chances 
for land reform in that region. This was met as a victory not only by the minor 
partners but also by the JP opposition in the Parliament. The followers of the DP, .IP 
and NTP, prepared welcome ceremonies to meet the 'agas' (landed notables ). Further, 
a partial amnesty was agreed upon.'*'  ^ These policies were important for the right 
wing partners of the coalition that would attract the ex-DP votes avoiding the increase 
of the .IP when it was in opposition.
The explicit social support behind the JP opposition was the main factor that 
had constrained the RPP to make concessions to its opponent. This raised reactions 
against İnönü within the RPP and its supporters by inviting İnönü to resign from both 
Prime-Ministership and the leadership of the Party. Even they went on protest 
demonstrations in the big cities. Interestingly, the opposition .IP became the main 
defender of İnönü against the protests, The reason was that, although the JP had 
lost some of the issues which would be used against the government, especially the 
right partners of the coalition, it could not refrain form defending the rightist policies 
of the RPP-headed government. Because, not only such a reconciliatory policy was 
expected to contribute to the legitimacy of its 'suspected' opposition attempts in the 
eyes of the military, but also it would prove its role in the concessionist policies of the 
government to the ex-Democrat electorate.
However, the rightist policies of the government did not stop the .IP's increase in 
adverse to government's expectations. It continued to gain strength, in the opposition, 
maintaining a irreconciliatory stand on the defense of the restoration of the full rights 
of the ex-Democrats. The local elections of November of 1963 produced a clear
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victory for the .TP's opposition, as the small partners of the coalition as well as the 
RPP suffered with great losses, indicating that the .TP began to be perceived as the 
only inheritor of the outlawed DP.*“’ Not its alternative policies formulated and 
defended before the society, but the stable approaches of the party and its leaders 
toward the amnesty question made the JP the only alternative of the government by 
1963. Beside this, the socio-economic policies of the weak coalitions for which the 
RPP and its leader İnönü were held to be responsible, seems to be contributed to the 
increase of the .TP. So the social support of the government, mainly those of the right 
wing partners of the coalition, turned to the opposition, namely the .IP. On the other 
hand, considering the heavy decrease in the votes of the smaller parties, the ex- 
Democrat electorate had tended punish these parties, because of their collaboration 
with İnönü who had been perceived to be imposed by the 1960 intervention.
Having been aware of the causes of their demise the smaller partners of the 
coalitions withdrew from the government after the 1963 local elections. Upon this, 
the President Gürsel appointed the leader of the .TP, Ragip Gümüşpala, to form the 
cabinet. But, since the minor parties were ideologically closer to the .TP, they refused 
formation of a coalition taking into consideration the possibility of disappearance 
within the policies of the big partner. In fact, this was a maneuver of the .TP to force 
the Parliament for an early election. However, it failed both in the establishment of a 
coalition or having an early election
The symbolic implication of being authorized with the establishment of 
government was more important for the .TP. It had demonstrated the outcome of the 
reconciliatory and compliant {uysal) opposition strategy of the .TP, launched either in 
or outside the government. The military had began to regard the .IP as a normal and
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acceptable partner of the political system and no longer required it to be held under 
the tutelage of İnönü.
Later, İnönü who was given again the responsibility to form the government, 
submitted the establishment of a minority coalition government with the independents 
on 22 December 1963. However, the government was to take a vote of confidence 
from a fragmented but ideologically closer opposition in the Parliament. But, an 
external problem, the Cyprus question, which increased the tension between Greece 
and Turkey and would culminate in a war, provided government with the vote of 
confidence during the early days of 1964. The opposition parties in the parliament 
demonstrated a general gesture which had been experienced in the West (the UK, 
France, Austria, Norway) during the W.W.II., with a need to show a national 
solidarity against a common enemy that postponed the internal political struggles for 
a while. However, the support given to the government was superficial and limited to 
external policies that the real differences were not to be forgotten. Throughout the 
1964, the government focused on the Cyprus Problem. That is to say, it enjoyed the 
support of the opposition. In the parliament, even the .IP refrained from any action 
which would lead to political crisis as long as İnönü did not bring conflicting issues to 
the Assembly. And İnönü was cautious about not to confront with the opposition 
being aware of the weaknesses of his coalition government against the existing 
parliamentary opposition who would bring down the government in case of a 
contradictory policy.
Although the opposition was ready to support the government in foreign policy, 
the place of Turkey in Western alliance turned out to be the main conflictual issue 
between government and opposition when the government looked for rapprochement 
with the USSR against the USA's Greek sided stand in the Cyprus question. İnönü
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had began to make strict declaration against the attitudes of the USA. When the issue 
came to the Assembly, especially Justice Party heavily criticized the government of 
having good relations with the communist Russia and strongly defended improvement 
of the relations with the USA, blaming İnönü of attributing the failures of the 
coalition to the USA.*** Although ideological conflicts began to appear between 
government and the opposition in the TGNA, the aim of the criticisms was, in fact, to 
prevent the government from strengthening its position in the eyes of electorate 
before the coming elections. So, the opposition did not support a pro-USSR or anti- 
American policies of government even after it heard about the .lohnson's letter which 
warned Turkey upon the Cyprus problem.
In the elections for the Senate, held in June 1964, the .JP won a victory against 
the government and its minor rivals. But, it lost its leader just few days before the 
elections. The Party would fall in a leadership crisis. In fact, the JP had been suffering 
from the internal conflicts between extremists and the moderates since its foundation 
that had decreased internal cohesion of the party affecting the strength of its 
opposition policies. The .TP could not take a permanently strong stand against neither 
the government nor the military, partly because of these internal conflicts. The same 
problem appeared itself in the Party Congress convened in November 1964 which 
was to elect the new party leader. In this Congress, Süleyman Demirel, nominated by 
the moderate wing defeated Sadettin Bilgiç who had been advocated by the extremist 
democrats and who tried to use anti-1960 feelings through posing attacks on the Coup 
and its leaders. The statement issued a short time earlier by the Chief of the General 
Staff Cevdet Sunay who warned against the actions of political parties which were 
dividing the country and agitating the people against the army facilitated the victory 
of Demirel. The warning was clearly directed against the .TP and the delegates voted 
overwhelmingly for Demirel.**- The result increased the acceptability of the party in
* *  * Ahmad, Demokrasi Süreci, 262.
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the eyes of the military leadership. But, Demirel preferred to wait in opposition 
during which his own position would be more secure both in the party and with the 
high command. Towards the end of 1964, he explicitly began to declare that he would 
bring the government down as soon as he found 226 votes in the Parliam ent.'So, 
the .IP, with its dynamic leader, increased the pressures on the government in the 
Parliament. Demirel began to hold meetings with the leaders of the other opposition 
parties in order to oust the Inönü-headed minority government from the power for an 
early election or to form a stronger coalition government. In the end, he successfully 
organized the defeat of the İnönü government during the budget debates and promptly 
established a coalition without the RPP and İnönü.
The .IP advocated formation of a proxy government under the leadership of Suat 
Hayri Ürgüplü, with Demirel as Vice-Premier, since the leader of the main opposition 
party was not a deputy in the Parliament at the time. Indicating impact of the military 
existence in civilian politics, all the issues, like the superiority of the 1961 
Constitution, land reform, welfare state policies, central planning in the economy that 
all had been criticized by the coalition partners when they were in opposition, 
included in the program. The RPP criticized the program as being to be far away from 
sincerity, from the real tendencies of the government partners. The RPP claimed that 
those who were criticizing until yesterday the principles defended by themselves have 
proposed a program full of ideas resembling those principles. In fact, the main goal 
of the government was to take the country to the general elections rather than 
implementing reform. It was a guarantee for the .IP to compete in a fair election since 
it could not, yet, establish reliable accommodation with the military. It inevitably had 
to give place in its program the issues on which military seemed to be insisting.
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although it had been carried on an implicit opposition, in the Parliament, in order to 
avoid their implementation during the previous coalition governments.
Demirel succeeded in arriving at the necessary accommodation. It had been 
evidenced that a government without the RPP was now possible, not only 
unacceptable for the military. This decreased the RPP's chance to use civilian-military 
elite support in the elections. So, it became to develop alternative policies attractive to 
the larger electorate that would increase its chance in the elections against the .IP."^
The campaign of the 1965 elections triggered a type of political competition 
based on real socio-economic alternatives. The imminent policies of the RPP began to 
be reflected on the issues like land reform, foreign policy, foreign investment in 
petroleum and other natural resources, economic planning, the condition of the 
foreign trade and the capital, which dominated the confrontation between government 
and the opposition."* Further, the issues indicated the beginning of an ideological 
division in the Turkish politics that was increased by the composition of the .IP- 
headed coalition. Although the previous coalitions had included the representatives 
from all political views, with passing of the RPP into the opposition, the new 
government had consisted of what were considered to be 'right wing' parties; the .IP, 
the NTP, the RPNP and the NP. The resulting struggle between the government and 
the opposition took on an ideological flavor which was to increase by the second half 
of the 1960s.'"
The RPP intensified its opposition attempts in this process of the 1965 elections 
since the record of the forth coalition was bound to effect the results. As Szyliowicz 
argued:
' Levi, "The .Iiistice Party," 62. 
' '* Szyliowicz, "Elections," 484. 
Ibid., 480.
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If the JP had provided a strong and stable government, the RPP would 
suffer, whereas if  the coalition broke apart or proved ineffectual, the RPP 
would benefit greatly.‘
Still, the RPP did not depend not only on the fate of the coalition government 
but also turned to formulate the leftist elements which would produce an alternative 
and distinctive stand against the JP's liberal aspirations. Clarifying its stand on the 
main campaign issues, it emphasized land reform, nationalization of the petroleum 
companies, reviewing the relations with the USA and strengthening the improving 
relations with the USSR against the Western attitude toward Turkey's thesis on the 
Cyprus question. The signs of the new stand further gained strength in the 1964 Party 
Congress. The Congress adopted a declaration entitled 'Our Ideal of a Progressive 
Turkey', developed by Turan Fevzioglu and Bülent Ecevit and it defined the place of 
the party on 'the left of the center', in the eventually emerging ideological spectrum of 
Turkish politics.“  ^ It was to be the main opposition strategy to be taken against the 
.IP. In contrast to the JP's increase, the gradual erosion of the RPP since 1961 had 
impelled it to make its first major new policy initiative since the advent of etatism in 
1931.‘20
For the majority of the RPP, it would eliminate the elitist perception of the 
party within the mass society, so that, permanent and more persuasive ties would be 
established with the larger electorate increasing its chance against the .TP in the 
elections. It was expected that, on the one hand, it would decrease the likelihood of 
defection from the Party's basis toward the extreme left. On the other, those who 
complained about social injustices would be taken into the ranks of the RPP. So, the 
new policy-design directed not only toward the right-wing parties but also against the 
extreme left alternative. Still, the ideologically oriented politicians within the RPP
"«Ibid., 480.
Tachau, "Peoples Party," 107.
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tended to see the 'left-of-the centre' as a comprehensive social democrat policy 
orientation which were to shape the future of the Party rather than a pragmatic 
opposition policy.’-*
Although the centre-left position of the RPP did never imply a structural 
opposition to the system, it raised strict reactions on the right. Stressing on the liberal, 
or, at most, mixed policies for economic development, the right parties attacked the 
etatist, leftist economic program of the opposition leading the debates to the extreme 
points. The RPP was accused of being communist or, more moderately, rightists 
politicians stated that the RPP' new Stand would lead to the establishment of 
communism in Turkey. It was reflected to be a radical threat to the social and 
religious believes of the Turkish people. The famous slogan of the .IP was that 'the left 
of the center is the road to Moscow' ( Ortanin Solu Moskova Yolu
The leftists, the RPP and the Turkish Labor Party ( Tiirkiye Isçi Partisi -TLP) 
which based its program on socialist orientations and organized within the free 
atmosphere created by the 1961 Constitution, responded in kind accusing their 
opponents by being reactionaries, profiteers and responsible for fascist attacks 
organized by the conservative people.’^ 3 However, the attacks of the governing right 
parties launched against the RPP's leftism was so effective that the whole opposition 
period of the RPP passed in defense to prove that the 'left-of-the centre' was not
communism. 124
The .IP won a great victory in the 1965 elections obtaining simple majority of 
the votes as its rightist partners and leftist rival decreased fu rth e r .T h e  RPP won its
Çavdar, "Halk Partisi," 2032.
'“ Ibid., 108.
Szyliowicz, "Elections," 481.
'3“* Birand, /2  Mart, 126.
'33 The 1965 election results as the percentage of the votes cast (V) and the percentage of the .seats 
obtained in the TGNA (S) were: the JP (V. 52.90, S. 53.30), the RPP (V. 28.70, S. 29.80), the NP (V. 
6.30, S. 6.90), the NTP (V. 3.70, S. 4.20), the TLP (V. 3.00, S. 3.30), the RPNP (V. 2.20, S. 2.40). 
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lowest rate in the elections that was blamed on the slogan of the 'left of the centre' 
which, for its defenders, could not be well explained to the people under the constant 
attacks of the right wing who interpreted it as one way of communism. The success of 
a structural opposition, the TLP, polling enough to have a representation in the 
TGNA was the most interesting result of the 1965 elections.
General Evaluation o f  the Period
During the first half of the 1960s, the opposition did not demonstrate its real 
types and patterns nor performed real functions in a political system where heavily 
dominated by the military elites. The members of the opposition parties needed to act 
in accordance with the expectation of the intervenor military leaders, rather than their 
own policy orientations and programs. They could not develop, particularly early 
years of the 1960s, socio-economic alternatives to the policies of the government. The 
survival became the prominent consideration of the opposition policies.
The out party or parties could not pose effective opposition attempts against the 
governments of the period. The Parliament became the only site for the parties of the 
parliamentary opposition. Even there, the opposition tried to chose a strategy and 
issues which would not disturb the military cadres though the opposition struggle of 
the .IP on the amnesty question which was vital to be able attract the ex-DP votes 
seemed to be more aggressive. However, the amnesty question which laid at the 
essence of the main opposition party of the period, the .IP, heavily contributed to the 
disappearance of the real policy confrontations between government and the 
opposition.
Although the 1961 Constitution institutionalized the place of the opposition in 
the Turkish democratic system, no structural opposition could dare to function in the 
post-intervention politics. In order to be able to function in this transition period, all
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political parties in the system have had to state their loyalties to the new system and 
the Constitution which had been established by the military junta, the NUC. Further, 
the non-structural opposition of the period was made 'very loyal' by the government 
headed by İnönü who had respect and closer ties among military leaders. İnönü made 
good use of his status in the hot atmosphere of military threats, in order to avoid the 
demands of the opposition and even to gather the support of the opposition behind the 
socio-economic policies of the government. Still, the opposition succeeded in 
blocking radical socio-economic reforms which had been envisaged by the 
Constitution and included in the programs of the RPP-headed coalitions. Under the 
impact of military pressures, the opposition of the parliamentary parties remained to 
be weak against the government of a party, the RPP, which had been advocated by the 
power holders of the political system in the aftermath of the 1960 Coup. As Tachau 
argued:
it is doubtful that İnönü could have suivived as the prime minister amid 
this instability (of the weak coalitions) without the covered, and 
sometimes overt, support o f the military command. In the end, when the 
military withdrew the support paved the way for the JP to come the 
power.
The proportional representation, which was designed before the 1961 elections 
in order to overcome the possibility of a party's domination in the parliament, tended 
to produce a fragmented parliamentary opposition that was to be inefficient against 
the government. For the 1961 election results created a fragmentation in the 
parliamentary parties, the opposition fragmented, too. However, since the inheritor of 
the DP became explicit as early as the referendum, held for the 1961 Constitution and 
was consolidated this trend throughout the 1961 general and 1963 local elections, the 
opposition steadily concentrated under the roof of the new democrat .IP. So, the
I2() Tachau, "Peoples Party," 107.
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position of the RPP headed coalitions became eventually shaky as the ex-Democrat 
voters decided which of the newly organized parties was the true heir of the outlawed 
Democrats.
The opposition of the .IP became more consistent and powerful when it solved, 
for the time being, the problem of moderate-extremist conflicts within the party 
toward the end of 1964 during which moderate Süleyman Demirel was elected for the 
leadership of the party upon the death of Ragip Gümüspala. The pragmatic 
reconciliatory policies of Demirel legitimized the party even in the eyes of the 
military cadres that opened the way to the power being the near alternative to the RPP 
in the political system.
On the other hand, the right wing nature of the forth coalition triggered the 
ideological conflicts which further inaugurated by the socio-economic changes, 
including industrialization and migration, experienced since 1950s. The statist RPP 
had to redefine itself in respect to its rightist and extreme leftist rivals in order to 
increase its chance in the elections. The new place of the RPP was on the 'left of the 
center' based on etatist, social and strictly secular programs. Still, the system 
remained to be moderate pluralism with four political parties and centripetal 
tendencies in party competition. *2? The moderating role of the military and 
bureaucratic institutions set by the Constitution, had been effective on the centripetal 
tendencies of the political competition since they deterred opposition from defecting 
toward irresponsibility in its attempts both in the Parliament and within the society. 
Expectedly, the opposition exhibited the most responsible trend in the case of an 
external problem caused by the Cyprus question which was assumed to be a national 
policy.
Sartori defines the 'moderate pluralism' as a system which operates on a three-four party basis that 
is bipolar and centripetal. Giavonni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized 
Pluralism," Polical Parties and Political Development, eds. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 139.
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During the period which was shadowed by the existence of the military in the 
civilian politics, the opposition always had to consider, in its strategies and policy 
formulations, what the military cadres would say. So, the successors of the ex- 
Democrats, which gathered within the JP by 1963, refrained from organizing public 
meetings, issuing violent criticisms either against the RPP and the military. They tried 
to solve all problems in the Assembly, including the amnesty question of the ex- 
Democrats which was to determine the successor of the outlawed DP. The greeting, 
reconciliatory opposition attempts of the period, carried on mainly by the JP, was 
termed as the 'shaky opposition'.'-*
Cited in Cizre Sakallioglu, AP-Ordu, 50. From Cüneyt Arcayürek, Cüneyt. Arcayürek Açikliyor: 4, 
Yeni Demokrasi Yeni Arayislar: 1960-1965 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, Aralik 1985), 103.
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Plurality in Opposition: 1965-1971
The composition of the parliament during the period of JP majority 
governments came closest to the multi-party system that the number of parties 
represented in the Assembly increased to six in 1965 and to eight in 1969. More 
importantly, the Assembly involved, now, more distinctive, both in terms of ideology 
and program, political parties who articulated the social structure which was in a 
process of rapid socio-economic transformation. The existence of the LPT which 
claimed to have a structural policy orientation with a socialist ideology; the defection 
of the RPP to the further left that "the left-of-the centre" policies began to take more 
secure roots in the party which defined its place more clearly in the political 
spectrum; control of the RPNP by the ultranationalist group of ex-colonel Alparslan 
Turkes; and the .IP, who achieved to obtain majority in the Parliament, having more 
liberal program emphasizing on the private sector that limited the responsibility of the 
government to providing people with security of property, of life and freedom to 
work and travel that eventually rendered the party as the political institution of the big 
industrial interests to which the Anatolian petit bourgeoisie launched an internal 
opposition toward the end of the period.
Still, the 'predominant' party system, which lasted since 1950 elections, was 
further strengthened by the 1965 elections in which the issue of succession the 
outlawed DP was settled when the JP received 53 per cent of the total votes cast that 
put an undeniable superiority over the NTP and the RPNP who had, too, competed for 
the votes of the ex-Democrats. The .IP and the RPP remained to be the major parties
Ahmad, Demokrasi Süreci, 282.
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in the TGNA although the electoral and parliamentary majorities were not as 
comfortable as those of the 1950s.*3‘^
The four development contributed to the emergence of a relatively plural 
parliamentary opposition during and after the 1965 elections. First of all, the 
industrialization, which had been triggered by the DP governments of 1950s, gained a 
new momentum with the enforcement of the Five Year Economic Plan in 1963. The 
resulting economic growth in the cities increased migration toward the industrialized 
urban centers that began to shake the old social cleavages based on cultural terms. 
The functional cleavages, inaugurated by the changes in the economic framework, 
further diversified the cleavages within the society that increased complexity in the 
electoral periphery of the political parties. So, the political parties felt the need to 
redefine their electoral base on functional terms. Second, the 1961 Constitution 
established a democratic legal framework which limited the government authority 
while aiming at flourishing the civil society that had never before been seen in 
Turkey. Third, the military ceased to be a constant threat to the civilian initiative of 
politics that military shadow over politics and the politicians began to disappear. 
Relating to the second, with the normalization of the regime by 1965, the liberal 
constitution of the 1961 provided a fortunate climate for the appearance and 
organization of various political currents, addressing to the differentiation in the 
social structure. Finally, is the adaptation of a 'national remainder system' to the 
electoral law, in .lanuary 1965, favored minor parties that the system opened the way 
for the smaller parties to have a voice in the parliament.
U. Erguder & R. H. Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change In 
Voting Patterns, in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin ( Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988 ), 86. Ergun Ozbudun, "The Turkish 
Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation." Middle Eastern Studies. 17-2 
(1987), 229-230.
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In spite of the fragmentation in the parliamentary party structure, the relative 
strength of the RPP in respect to smaller parties concentrated the opposition in that 
party. So, the Republicans-Democrats rivalry of the pre-1960 now changed into an 
equally bitter contest between the RPP and the .IP. As in the pre-1960 period, 
compared with big parties, the smaller parties had little parliamentary influence and 
little impact in the country as a whole.’^  ^However, this does not mean that the other 
parties, particularly the LPT, disappeared in the parliamentary struggles. The 
distinctive nature of the LPT's program was to give her a special place in the 
parliamentary debates that attracted the attention disproportionate to its number in the 
parliament. Therefore, it is better to have a close look at the structural, but 
constitutional opposition of the LPT and its opposition efforts in the parliament since 
it provided the electorate with a distinctive alternative and claimed representation of a 
definite social sector.
The LPT was founded by a group of trade union leaders, who had broken away 
from the official trade union federation, Tiirk-ls, in order to better represent the 
interests of the labor in the TGNA without having a further goal like the 
establishment of a socialist system based on labor movement. But, the party acquired 
a new character by 1962, when socialist intellectual M. Ali Aybar was given the 
chairmanship of the party by its founding b o a rd .F ro m  then on, the party began to 
acquire a socialist program. The LPT was defined, in its program adopted in 1962, as:
Jacop M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey ( Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974 ), 17. 
Ibid., 123-125.
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democratic, independent and socialist political organization, marching to 
power through legal means and based on history and science, o f the 
Turkish working class and o f the groups which arrived consciously at the 
happy conclusion o f seeing unity of fate with it ( the working class), and 
followed its democratic leadership, such as socialist intellectuals, 
agricultural workers, insufficiently landed peasants, craftsmen, small 
businessmen, salary and wage earners, low income professionals, in a 
word all citizens leading a life based on their own effort.*^“*
While the Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code'^^ continued to 
forbid establishment of legal communist party, the new Constitution had allowed the 
creation of a socialist party, if the rules of the game in a democratic system was 
accepted. Then, the party was to be constitutional as long as it maintained the 
democratic nature of its strategy. Aware of this fact, the program stressed the Party’s 
desire to follow democratic ways and to respect for the C onstitution.The LPT was 
also careful in its proposals of radical reform to be implemented when the Party 
comes to power that were justified through illustrating them as a remedy to the socio­
economic backwardness of the country. In the end, it asserted that the solutions to the 
problems of I'urkey laid in bringing the labor to power through political education 
carried on by the party, under the protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution.'^·^
The LPT advocated a 'planned etatism’ siding with the labor and being 
implemented and controlled through workers' participation."**  ^ The main strategy of 
the 'planned etatism' is the nationalization of the key means of production and 
exchange; government investment in big industry; implementing a land reform
134 yyp Prog,-ami, ( Istanbul: 1964 ), 9. Cited in Kemal H. Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party of 
Turkey." The Middle East Journal. 21 ( 1962 ), 163.
The Articles prohibited the formation of organizations advocating the supremacy of one social 
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distributing lands of the notables to the landless peasants; harmonizing education with 
economic development; eradicating unemployment; peaceful international relations 
and ceasing exploitation of man by his fellow .A lthough the private sector, which is 
assumed to be cooperating with the external capitalist classes in the exploitation of 
Turkish people, was seen as the major factor behind the development of 
underdevelopment in Turkey, it was to be auxiliary of the state economy in the 
planned framework and was to be gradually limited as its functions were taken over 
by government enterprises.
According to Shaw, the stand of the LPT towards the private sector is a lib 
service. He claimed that the Party could not come about with more radical promises, 
as long as it remained in opposition, in a society where people had a strong ownership 
tradition. It had to show flexibility on the private sector whose exploitive attempts, 
still, were to be controlled by subverting it to the 'planned etatism' and party 
mechanisms.'“*'
The party's heavy denunciation of exploitation; strong support given to the 
nationalization of the larger means of production and exchange; state monopoly in 
heavy industry which is assumed to be the most exploitative sector; central planning 
in all economic spheres and commitment to the labor class on the road to power that 
implies a class struggle, made the LPT a structural opposition in the parliament. In 
Duverger's classification, the LPT held a 'conflict over basic principles' of the existing 
socio-economic system of the Republic.'“*2 But, it was constitutional in the sense that 
it employed legal means to realize its goals. After all, the 1961 Constitution set three 
preconditions for the establishment of the political parties that their programs and
Lirndixu, Radical, 141.
Ibid., 138-139.
Stanfoid F. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, Osmanli İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye , trans. Mehmet 
Harmanci ( Istanbul; E Yayinlari, 1983 ), 499.
Duverger, Political Parties, 418. He classified the types of conflicts between political parties in a 
multi-party democracy into three: The first one is the 'conflicts without principles'; the .second, the 
'conflicts over subsidiary principles and third one is the 'conflicts over basic principles'.
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statutes would not be contrary to (1) the democratic principles based on human rights 
and freedoms; (2) the principles of the secular Republic; and (3) the integrity of the 
state with its nation2^^
Although the LPT defended policy orientations which would be proved to be 
contradicting with the Penal Code, if not the Constitution, it was allowed to compete 
for power in the political system. On the one hand, the LPT's leadership believed that 
both the military and the advocates of the May 27, 1960 intervention supported the 
p a r t y . O n  the other hand, their full commitment, on every occasion, to the 27th 
May and its Constitution, too, contributed to the legitimacy of the party in the new 
political framework. They always claimed that the 1961 Constitution and the reforms 
it envisaged would not be realized in the absence of a party, like the LPT.'“^^
With a distinctive socialist character from other political parties, the LPT 
attracted the progressive, leftist intellectuals and students who had been disappointed 
with the RPP's implementations during the Inönü-led coalitions. Although the LPT 
developed well-designed policy alternatives to the stand of the Republicans as the 
'reformist only in word' ( sözde reformcular ), it failed to mobilize its major 
electorate, the labor. Instead, the upper-middle class intellectuals of the three big 
cities, namely Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara constituted both the party elite and the 
major electorate.'"*®
Despite the fact that, most of the LPT's deputies lacked personal experience or a 
tradition about the use of parliamentary mechanisms for a socialist struggle simply 
due to the ban of the socialist activities for years in Turkey, the party group was very 
active in the parliamentary processes. Except for its proposals about the situation of 
foreign capital and petroleum companies operating in Turkey, the LPT sought only
Turkish Constitution(1961), Article 57. 
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unessential modifications in the existing rules and applications for the good of the 
lower classes. It was supposed that, more radical demands beyond this point, like 
massive nationalization policies, would infringe the seriousness of the party as long as 
it stayed in opposition.
In fact, any opposition against the numerical majority was ineffective as a 
consequence of the parliamentary procedure. Being aware of the fact, the goal of the 
party's representatives in the Assembly was to bring alternatives to the proposals 
brought by the majority or other opposition parties, rather than prompt changes in the 
government policies. So that, only the failure of the major parties in their policy 
designs would increase the credibility of the LPT's policies in the next elections. In 
that case, the public opinion formation became the main objective of the party, 
including its struggles in the TGNA. The strategy of the party in the Parliament was 
well explained by Sadun Aren's address on the 1967 budget of the .IP government:
...If a state is dominated by capitalist class, it will pursue capitalist 
policies. But, if a state is weighted by the labor class then it will choose a 
development strategy other than capitalism. But, this is to be determined 
by the votes of the people in a democratic society. For this reason, we do 
not hope that the .Justice Party would follow our advises. Because, the 
initiative is not in their hands. We just explain our views and
criticisms... 148
Although they pursued a moderate stand in the TGNA, the system-oriented 
opposition of the LPT attracted violent reactions from both the .TP government and 
other opposition parties. Their criticisms of the system and the prevailing socio­
economic policies were heard and answered. Some of its deputies were heavily beaten 
in the Assembly. Then, the 'national remainder system' which favored small parties 
was abdicated was to eliminate the socialist opposition in the parliament.
Aren, 77P, 181-182. 
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Contrastingly, the structural, political or violent reactions taken against the LPT 
strengthened the position of those who questioned parliamentary methods for the 
establishment of socialist system in Turkey. The extreme leftist opposition, adding 
strategy changes in the socialist movements over the world, began to shift towards the 
non-parliamentary means by 1968.*'*^  This trend was also reflected in the LPT. It lost 
its internal cohesion. The radical 'Aren-Boran clique', who favored scientific 
socialism and had suspicions about the efficiency of democratic struggle, began to 
dominate the party executive against the 'Aybar group' who had began to deviate from 
scientific Marxism and foresee a 'smiling socialism' {giUeryiizlu sosyalisni) which 
committed to the humanitarian aspects of bourgeois democracies like individual 
rights, electoral processes and separation of p o w e r s . F r o m  then on, the party 
radicalized its stand increasing its sympathy toward and strengthening ties with the 
non-parliamentary leftist movements and separatist Kurdish nationalism upon which 
the party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971.
As a structural opposition, the LPT was unsuccessful in achieving modifications 
in the system and/or policies and personnel of government, it did effect the policies 
on the left of the political spectram. The RPP, the main opposition party in the 
TGNA, felt the need to specify further the policies formulated before 1965. They 
should have been in a form, on the one hand, able to regain the votes lost to the LPT 
while, on the other, avoiding possible antipathies within the conservative lower 
classes to whom it desired to approach abandoning its traditional elite structure. 
Although, as a consequence of the party's failure in the previous elections with the 
left-of-the centre slogans, there were some opportunists who insisted on the use of the 
more populist strategies, against the pragmatic policies of the .IP, until coming to 
power after which the left-of-the centre program would be implemented, 'but it did
Birand, 12 Mart, 145-146.
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not take much acceptance. Instead, the left-of-the centre policies began to gain weight 
within the party cadres. Bülent Ecevit, the head of the group defending the left-of-the 
centre, was elected as the Secretary General in the 18th Party Congress of the RPP 
held in 1966. This meant, for the RPP, to defect inevitably toward the left opening the 
party to the leftist programs which altered the direct of the party's competition from 
centripetal to centrifugal forms. It seems to be that the RPP began to approach to 
semi-loyality‘^ 2 in opposition with the efforts to create a credible alternative to the 
policies of the right, those of the .IP, and the extreme left, the LPT, under the effects 
of the increasing complexity of the Turkish electorate caused by the socio-economic 
transformation.
The initiative which gradually transformed the RPP after 1965 is that the 
inability of an elitist RPP, preserving its old views and structure, to compete with the 
.IP, who achieved integration of larger social groups within itself, had been seen. The 
process of dissolution of the older cleavages had provided the RPP with an 
opportunity to achieve a realignment in itself that was possible if credible alternatives 
are developed addressing to the needs of people. This process is seen as a result of the 
interconnection between a political party in search of a new identity and a society 
who experiences fundamental changes in the process of a rapid capitalist 
development.
Actually it was the only way to go. Staying the same, as the guardian of the 
Republican principles with an elitist structure, was clearly unproductive in 
competition with the JP. It was the evidence that the RPP had not achieved a majority
Özbudun, "Party System," 231.
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enough to form a government since the transition to democracy. The party needed a 
transformation in order to fully adopt itself to the competitive politics. But, it could 
not move to the right since it would have been viewed by many of the RPP's strongest 
supporters as perverting its very raison d'être. Moving toward the extreme left also 
had multiple dangers, including the likelihood of antagonizing the party's strong core 
of more conservative leaders which had happened a n y w a y . T h e  conservative 
Kemalist group, headed by Turhan Fevzioglu, found the new policies of the RPP as 
extreme leftist and anti-Kemalist, left the party to form the Reliance Party (RP-Güven 
Partisi) in 1967.
On the other hand, blaming on the ongoing reactions coming from within or out 
of the party, mainly the .IP, the defenders of the new stand claimed that communism 
could only be avoided through not emotional, but rational policies which was the 'left- 
of-the centre' that would eliminate the physical conditions leading to increase of the 
extreme left.*^  ^In the words of Ecevit:
If the measures to avoid injustices, poverty, repression and to implement 
development policies within social justice are not taken, the unrest, 
accumulated in the people living in miseiy, may come to the point of 
eruption. Then, the extreme left movements may find the basis to create a 
destructive flood. The 'left-of-the centre' is the safest wall and the most 
effective barrier against this developments.
The left-of-the centre aimed at also attracting votes from the .IP's electorate, not 
only from the extreme left, as evidenced by the emphasis of the new stand. The main 
focus of the new emphasis, developed against extreme left and the parties of the right, 
was economic and social, and revolved around promises to continue the rapid growth 
reached in the DP era. But, the injustices, the RPP claimed, which had been
Weiker, The Modernization, 124.
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characterized the DP era and was being taken over by the ruling .IP, were to be 
corrected. The investments, for the good of the peasants and the rural areas, done by 
the DP and then by the .IP, were to be accelerated by the implementation of a land 
reform. However, similar laws had been proposed a number of times in 1945 and 
during coalition governments between 1961 and 1965 but not passed, it was not likely 
that many believed in this RPP program. For the urban areas, the program foreseen 
the continuation of high rate of investment, but returns were to be used for the general 
good rather than as profits for private entrepreneurs. In order to preserve the 
Anatolian petit bourgeoisie, a restrictive policy was to be imposed on the importation 
of foreign capital. More restrictive policies were to be applied on the big foreign 
companies functioning in the operation of Turkish natural resources, like mining and 
petroleum.
In fact, the stand of the RPP had been widely known in etatism from early 
1930s and in labor since its 10th Congress (1953) where the right to strike was 
accepted and its content was further expanded in the declaration issued just before the 
1957 elections. But, confronting with a rival like LPT within the changing social 
cleavages, it radicalized its views on labor so as to stress on the formation of a social 
system providing people with social security, social justice and the conditions suitable 
to develop themselves; and warned about the evils of capitalist economic system 
which was interpreted as pushing people to egoism, exploitation and social strife.
On the other hand, the problems of the peasantry, for the first time, had been heavily 
taken into the new policy of the RPP since their votes were vital if the .IP was to be 
weakened.
The RPP's loyal opposition in the TGNA was policy-oriented. Although It 
began to mention about change under the effect of the radical wing, the Party did not
158 Weii^er, The Modernization, 123-124. 
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bring radical demands, like land reform. It was, perhaps, because of the impossibility 
of oppositional success before a majority JP government who had been demonstrating 
a strong internal cohesion, for the time being. Its criticisms concentrated on the 
responsibility of the government for the social unrest in the country caused by the 
rising prices and inflation on which the JP government had done nothing while, 
instead, being busy with the vote-catching political issues, like restoration of the 
political rights of ex-DP members.*^ ^^
If the opposition is concentrated in a single political party that today's 
opposition may tomorrow assume the sole responsibility of office, as in the case of 
the RPP during the period, it preserves itself from any exaggerated demagogy which 
might react to its advantage. But, although the etatism, which is the core of the left- 
of-the centre policies, was strongly defended by the RPP, its strict criticisms on the 
state investments raised some questions about the extend of the responsibility of the 
RPP’s opposition policies. Certainly, upon the beginning of the implementation of the 
Second Five Year Development Plan, launched in 1967, it opposed rightly to the 
loans and subsidies given to the private sector that would infringe the social justice, 
but plans for the construction of the first Bosphorous Bridge and the Keban Dam, 
which were the two of the biggest state investments of the period, were also opposed 
without any substantive alternative policy design.
Despite such irresponsible tendencies, the RPP cooperated with the .TP on the 
election of the new president upon the death of Cemal Giirsel in 1966. Demonstrating 
its intention on the normalization of democratic political system with the decrease of 
the military threat, election of the Head of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay, who had 
sided with the civilian authorities during the coup attempts of Aydemir, for the post 
was supported in the Parliament in cooperation with the JP. However, the other
Ahmad, Demokrasi Süreci, 283. 
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cooperative action of the party with the government contradicted with the first one 
that would strengthen the military's existence within the politics. This was the 
rejection of the interpellation given by the TLP about the stand of the government on 
the Declaration of the new Head of the Staff Cemal Turhal, which was revealed by 
the press in 1967 and warned the military cadres about the rise of the extreme left that 
should have been prevented. But, this is to be taken as a pragmatic action so as to 
weaken the social base of the LPT who was the main rival of the RPP on the left of 
the political spectrum.
Although the RPP did not succeeded in achieving policy regulations in the 
government policies in the direction of its own program, the party group, especially 
the radical wing, was very effective in preventing the .IP government from exercising 
full authority by a serious of well-planned strategies. Sometimes, the intention of the 
RPP's opposition in the Parliament seemed to be obstruction of the governibility. For 
this end, the strategy was to make good use of the parliamentary or non-parliamentary 
mechanisms provided with the 1961 Constitution which had increased the power of 
the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic mechanisms were turned to be an effective site to 
be used by the opposition. One of the strategies was that there were delaying tactics in 
the Assembly, ranging from the introduction of endless amendments to bills to 
debates amounting to a sort of obstmcting legislation. Second, there were constant 
challenges to the constitutionality of laws, and often the Constitutional Court, would 
contribute by imposing down the .IP legislation, since a good part of its personnel 
sympathized with the RPP and its radical social views. Third, through the Council of 
State, the bureaucracy, although officially neutral, could in different ways block the 
administrative decisions of the .IP government.-phat is why, the political system 
approached to the 'two-tier' system of Norway that the government decisions were 
determined through the struggle between the majority party and the authorized public
162 Karpat, "Army-Civilian Relations," 143-144.
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agencies as it was defined in the Constitution and mostly the result turned out with the 
victory of the bureaucratic sides. The JP could only respond by complaining that it 
was being prevented from carrying out the power given to it by the 'national will' 
{inilli irade) as Demirel Said:
The Constitutional Court was put over the authority of the TGNA and 
over the elected government was the Council o f State. The elections lost 
their significance. The State was made a 'Republic o f the Judges' with an 
assumption that the elected may do wrong. The Council o f State gave six- 
thousand decisions in four years though it had did six in one-hundred 
years in France. The working of the government was almost impossible. 
We tried to work desperately.
Meanwhile, the internal crisis within the extreme left, the LPT, and the 
domination of the left-of-the centre policies within the RPP after the retire of the 
conservative group of Turhan Fevzioglu increased the RPP's chance for the power 
toward the 1969 elections. The RPP would obtain the majority in the 1969 elections 
with votes to be attracted from the .TP's basis. In that case, the RPP leaders did not 
dare to trust on only the left-of-the centre policies and, taking into consideration the 
increasing possibility of power, the leader of the main opposition party, İnönü, 
declared that he would support the law to be proposed for the restoration of ex- 
Democrats' political rights that had not been achieved, until the time, since the 
opposition did not support a constitutional change.
Although the RPP's support was reflected to be a friendly rapprochement 
between İnönü and ex-President Celal Bayar, it was a well-planned political 
maneuver of the opposition. Still, the decision of İnönü attracted strong reactions 
from within the RPP and the military who used to see the 27th May intervention as a 
product of the co-operation between the RPP, particularly İnönü, and the military.'^’*
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But, İnönü did not concede and succeeded in turning the directions of military 
pressures towards the government and Demirel, since the proposal had been brought 
by the J P. If Demirel withdrew the proposal in case of a military threat, he would lose 
the support of rightist electorate, mainly those of the ex-Democrats.^^^ The political 
amnesty was approved in the TGNA. But, İnönü's plan was realized when Demirel 
had to make a speech in the Assembly, in which he stated 'isn't it our responsibility 
not to infringe the military as it is to give the political rights back'.'^’'’ So, the proposal 
was voted out in the Senate by the votes of the JP itself that shocked the ex- 
Democrats and disturbed also the radical-conservative wing, headed by Saadettin 
Bilgiç, within the party. As İnönü expected, the leader of the ex-Democrats, Celal 
Bayar, called the ex Democrat electorate not to vote for the JP in the coming 
elections. On the other hand, in order to assure the support of ex-Democrat groups, 
the RPP announced, on its official gazette Uhis, that it would enact an amnesty if the 
RPP obtained the majority in the elections.
In that case, the strategy of the main opposition RPP for the election campaign 
became appeasing the rightist electorate in order not to lose the chance obtained with 
the failure of the .IP in the ex-Democrats' question which had been the main political 
issue in the post-1960 period. It was stated to all party members with a declaration 
that they had to refrain from the speeches reviving the old political differences and 
strife; speeches be evaluated to be against the national will; and the topics like 
progressive vs. reactionary, Kemalist vs. anti-Kemalist. Instead, the social and 
economic reforms, against the 'conservative' JP, should have been put in the core of 
the campaign.’^’’ So, the RPP preferred to shift the way of competition strategy 
toward the functional basis, rather than the culturally dominated traditional party 
competition of the previous years.
'<■’5 Ibid., 177.
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However, the results of the 1969 elections showed that the RPP was far from 
being an alternative to the JP, the alienated rightist voters preferred not to vote in the 
elections rather than voting for the RPP in which leftist tendencies had gained a 
secure place. Ecevifs revolutionary slogans, like 'land belongs to those who plant it 
and the water is for those who use it' or 'we will fight until all lands are owned by the 
peasantry' were too radical for the rightist electorate as long as JP achieved a 
considerable economic development while preserving a lower rate of inflation and 
that the average growth rate between 1962 and 1970 is 6.6 and the inflation was 5 per 
cent.'^ **
The election results did not change the distance in the Parliament between the 
JP and the RPP who had made great effort, throughout its opposition years, to 
produce a credible alternative to the government policies Although the .IP performed 
badly in respect to the 1965 elections, the RPP, too, suffered with the decreasing rate 
of its votes. Among the smaller parties, only the RP of Fevzioglu obtained a 
considerable vote The abdication of the 'national remainder system' before the 
elections had further weakened the power of the minor parties in the Parliament as the 
Turkish party system gained, again, a two-party character, The extreme left LPT 
and the RPNP, who changed its name as Nationalist Action Party (NAP) colored with 
fascist tendencies before the elections, could win two and one representatives 
respectively. The opposition concentrated in the RPP in the post-1969 Parliament, 
'fhat is to say, the system tended to produce a more competitive, polarizing party 
struggle between the JP and its main opponent the RPP which was standing in the 
Parliament now with an ideologically colored policy alternatives.
16« Turgut, Demirel, 270.
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Meanwhile the JP was to cope with not only the opposition of the RPP, but also 
with the intra-party opposition headed by the Bilgic's religio-conservative group who 
began to increase their opposition to Demirel's hegemony within the party and his 
liberal economic policies favoring the big capitalists. Still, they continued to 
demonstrate a solidarity against the RPP opposition in the Parliament during the 
aftermath of elections in which Demirel had consolidated his power despite adverse 
expectations. However, this cohesion was proved to be artificial and steadily 
weakened the position of the .IP majority government before the Republican 
opposition that culminated in the fall of the .IP government when Bilgiç's group voted 
against the budget in cooperation with the RPP in .Tanuary 1970.
The cause of the internal opposition within the .IP was the result of the socio­
economic development though personal conflicts too contributed it. The party had 
been controlled by the big capitalists toward the end of 1960s. So, Demirel eventually 
lost the support of the most conservative wing, representative of the interests of the 
Anatolian, landowners, small traders and artisans.^’ ' The process of the 
industrialization, in Turkey, had created a more complex periphery of electorate for 
the political parties, so, the .IP had lost the ability to satisfy the interests of each sector 
within itself through slight policy modifications. The Party had become to choose its 
exact social basis which was to be the bourgeois of the big industrial sectors..
So that, those who felt the pressure of the increasing capitalist classes began to 
look for the means to create their own mechanisms of political opposition.Respect 
to traditional values, religious beliefs and representation of Anatolian petit 
bourgeoisie as well as lower classes constrained by the increase of capitalist 
development were the common themes in the parties of the oppressed sectors of 
Anatolia. The Democratic Party (DemP) which was founded by the Bilgiç group
Zurcher, A Modern History, 263-265. 
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when they retired from the .IP, on the rejection of budged, the National Order Party 
(NOP-Milli Selamet Partisi) headed by Necmettin Erbakan with pro-Islamist 
tendencies; and the Turkes's NAP with fascist aspirations were to become the 
institutional bodies of the opposition of the Anatolian petit bourgeoisie and religious 
consei"vatism.
Although personal conflicts were also effective in the establishment of the DP, 
the NOP and the NAP came out with distinctive radical alternatives to the policies of 
.IP on its right. As the NAP upheld a corporatist system in economy, like Italian 
fascism, which denied existence of different social classes but social sectors 
supporting each other, and a hierarchical social structure,'' '^* the NOP defended return 
to a social system based on Islamic brotherhood which was to cure the social 
deficiencies of the industrialization. The NAP presented 'national economy' against 
the 'Islamic economic model' of the NOP that, in fact, both accepted a mixed 
economy where the private sector would in time be favored and gain importance.
Although both parties had some anti-system opposition tendencies in the sense 
that the NAP referred to a 'national state' {inilli devlei) having a system of 'national 
democracy' which featured a parliament where all social sec to r s 'wou ld  be 
represented as well as a supreme leader endowed with broad powers above those of 
the parliament''^’ that was contrary to the existing democratic system. On the other 
hand, the NOP stressed on a system where religious values are respected. It classified 
the RPP as the 'leftist' and the .IP as 'liberal' which were rooted in the Western culture 
and so alien to Turkish people, while the party presented itself as the 'true soul' of the
M. Ali Agaogullari, "The Ultranationalist Right," in Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, eels. 
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Turkish culture. It would establish a political system where the 'tme soul' of the 
people would find a respectable place. While the Party strongly favored secularism 
at the official level, the pro-religious sayings of its leaders and writings of its 
intellectuals tended to exhibit an anti-secular stand contrary to the basic principles of 
the Republican regime.
Although it articulated the differentiation in Turkish society, this fragmentation 
on the right of the political spectrum dispersed the centres of opposition from the late 
1960s that increased parliamentary instability and defected the Turkish party system 
from a predominantly bipolar system toward a multipolarirty.’**^ -phe Rpp opposition 
was, now, stronger and more competitive in a party system which created a 
fragmented structure on the right. The power of the opposition further increased when 
the .IP lost its majority in the Parliament after the defection of more conservative 
groups. So, the economic and social situation exacerbated while the government was 
trying to cope with the intra-party opposition, the RPP's destructive opposition and 
steadily increasing social strife caused by non-parliamentary extreme leftists and 
fascists sponsored by the NAP.
Although a strong government was needed for the solution of mounting socio­
economic problems, the RPP rejected a coalition with the JP. Because, an early 
election was expected to give the power to the RPP as the inability of a weak JP 
government increased the credibility of the RPP's policy alternatives. However, the 
alternative to the unsuccessful government of the .TP became the military intervention 
on 12 March 1971. The military appeared in the political scene again in favor of an 
'above party' cabinet which was expected to be strong enough to solve the socio­
economic problems and to materialize the reforms envisaged by the Constitution.
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Dernirel complained about the unfavorable stand of the opposition in the Parliament 
against the military memorandum. According to him, the military intervention would 
be prevented if the parliamentary opposition sided with government against the 
military: He stated that:
You can do nothing on yourself to save democracy and the Parliament. 
Wliat 1 did wish is that all rise up. The real responsibility belongs to the 
opposition. It should have reacted and asked: 'what happens?' However,
all were silent like a lamb. I could not feel support, behind me, from the
• 181opposition.'  ^*
In fact, the main opposition, the RPP, had been divided about the reaction to be 
given against the military. İnönü accepted the memorandum as a democratic action 
while Ecevit strongly reacted and stated that it could not be termed democratic. For 
Ecevit, the actual target of the military action aimed at preventing the rise of the left- 
of-the centre policies that had been explicit when Nihat Erim, who was critical about 
the new stand within the RPP, appointed as the prime minister of the technocratic 
government.'*^“
The left-of-the centre policies had been designed to break the historical 
coalition of the military and the bureaucracy that would strengthen the party's ties 
with the people and increase its chance for the power against the .IP. However, the 
approval of the military intervention was to consolidate its elitist character in the eyes 
of the people.'*^ This consistent stand of Ecevit helped him to defeat Inönü in the 
election for the party leadership in 1972 that was the ultimate victory of the left-of-the 
centre policies within the RPP as well.
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Since the government and the Parliament functioned under the immediate 
directives of the High Command and ministers were invited from all the parties, the 
activities of the political parties during the 1971-1973 interim period can not be 
analyzed as normal policy tendencies of the intra-parliamentary parties. Still, it should 
be indicated that the LPT and the NOP were dissolved by the Constitutional Court 
because of their non-constitutional and anti-system policy orientations. Beside this, in 
contrast to the 1960 Coup, the contribution of the .TP to the military attempts for the 
limitation of constitutional democratic rights, which curtailed individual and 
associotional liberties, strengthened its ties with the state as the RPP's unfavorable 
stand against the post-1971 regime steadily increased pushing it to a semi-loyal 
position in the eyes of the military, the guardian of the r eg ime, t ha t  was the end of 
RPP's traditional 'grand coalition'. Still, for the democratization of the political 
system, the two parties continued to cooperate in blocking the election of a radical 
military officer in favor of a moderate one. Fahri Korutiirk was elected for the 
presidency through the cooperation of the two parties in order to avoid the election of 
Faruk Giirler who was one of the prominent leaders of the 1971 semi-intervention.
General Evaluation o f  the Period
During the reign of the .TP majority governments, the opposition in the TGN A 
displayed attempts not only to check and limit the action of political authority but also 
to produce alternative policies to those of the government. It began to perform the 
real functions expected from a political opposition. Since the Constitution secured the 
place of political opposition in the system, authoritarian defection of government was 
prevented through a system of non-parliamentary checks and balances. In this case, 
the opposition parties needed to develop attractive policies to the larger population so 
as to obtain the majority in the elections.
Cizre Sakallioglu, AP-Ordu, 111.
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The disappearance, at least, decrease of military tutelage over the civilian 
politics during the second half of the 1960s, contributed to the way of political 
opposition. By the decrease of military pressures, they became able to design their 
own policy formulations and oppositional strategies rather than those advocated or 
imposed by the military authorities. In that case, since the differentiation of the 
political preferences, inaugurated by socio-economic transformation, changed the 
cleavage structure in Turkish society, it initiated a search in the political parties for 
the ways of articulating new demands. So that, towards the second half of the 1960s, 
program-based attempts weighted the strategies of the opposition parties. In this 
process, the RPP defected toward the left by adopting a stand of the centre-left as the 
■IP's pro-big bourgeois nature became more explicit.
However, since the big parties were not able to integrate conflicting interests 
and political views, both from the left and right, new social groups began to look for 
their own bodies of political opposition, leading to a fragmentation in the party 
system. In the free atmosphere of civilian and organizational rights introduced by the 
1961 Constitution, new political parties appeared with distinctive radical claims on 
the socio-economic policies of the government as well as on the nature of the regime. 
The LPT was one which started the ideological fragmentation with its structural 
orientation in opposition. They found representation in the TGNA by the 1965 
elections simply due to the electoral system which was adopted with a national 
remainder system favoring the smaller parties. Still, since the opposition concentrated 
in the system-loyal RPP throughout the .IP's majority governments, the competition of 
the opposition became centripetal despite it had to demonstrate, sometimes, a 
centrifugal tendency with a semi-loyal character, in competition with its extreme-left 
rival, namely the LPT.
The abdication of the national remainder system before the 1969 elections 
further concentrated the opposition in the RPP while it decreased the representation of 
the minor parties in the TGNA. However, the emergence of the DemP, NOP in the
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aftermath of the elections, and religio-nationalist defection of the NAP pushed the 
bipolar party system toward multipolarity with their ideological orientations. The 
period of predominant party system ended in the late 1960s. In that case, the inability 
of the .IP government in solving mounting socio-economic problems increased the 
chance of the RPP whose opposition attempts began to be stronger with the extension 
of the party fragmentation to the right of the political spectrum.
The site of the opposition had been confined to the Assembly during the first 
half of the 1960s, since the non-parliamentary struggle was perceived, by the military 
authority, as a threat to the social order. However, parliamentary procedure had not 
permitted the opposition to affect the implementations of the government. The 
parliamentary opposition against the .IP majority governments, during which military 
shadow over the civilian politics released, became able to use the non-parliamentary 
opportunities in order to increase the power of the opposition. Public meetings, held 
by the opposition parties, were taken not only as an opportunity to explain their 
alternative policies but also to impose social pressures on the actions of the governing 
party.
On the other hand, the civilian-bureaucratic institutions set by the 1961 
Constitution had effectively constrained the actions of the political power in the post- 
1960 Turkish politics. They began to be a very decisive site for the opposition in this 
period. Especially the supreme judicial courts, like the Constitutional Court and the 
Council of State, were frequently used by the opposition in order to blockade 
implementations of the government. However, it was to be an initiative for the 
colonization of the bureaucratic mechanisms in the post-1970 period, since the 
political parties realized that in order to exercise full power, the view of the 
bureaucracy was important.
The period portrayed development of a parliamentary opposition with its real 
functions. It struggled not only to check the actions of the political power but also to
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introduce alternative policies providing the electorate with an opportunity of choice in 
the elections. In this process, although the party system fragmented in the TGNA, the 
concentration of opposition in the RPP empowered the opposition as a credible 
alternative. The smaller parties were not effective in their oppositional attempts 
though the LPT was more apparent with its distinctive stand in the Parliament.
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CHAPTER IV.
Parliamentary Opposition: 1973-1980
This chapter was designed in order to evaluate the process of degeneration of 
oppositional attempts of the parliamentary parties after 1973 elections. The 
fragmentation and ideological polarization of the party system during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, that appeared also in the post-1973 TGNA, determined the nature of 
the opposition policies in this period of Turkish politics.
Dispersion and Polarization of Parliamentary Opposition
1973 elections marked the end of the predominant party system in Turkish 
politics, which had prevailed since 1950. The DP and then the JP were able to stay in 
power, without being confronted by an immediate political alternative thanks to the 
electoral support from various groups across the society. However, the 1973 elections 
produced a party system of extreme pluralismi*^ in the TGNA with a multipolar 
fragmentation and a polarizing, centrifugal tendencies. No party obtained a sufficient 
majority to form the cabinet. The fragmentation in the party system on the right and 
left of the political spectrum, in the late 1960s, reflected in the new Parliament. 
Although the RPP succeeded, this time, to obtain the plurality of the votes , it was not 
in a position to declare victory against its immediate opponent, the .TP, who polled 
near to the rate of the RPP. The real increase was experienced in the smaller and 
splinter parties. The National Salvation Party (NSP), who was founded as the 
successor of the outlawed NOP, and NAP, both were suspected about their loyalties to 
the regime, obtained considerable representation in the TGNA. The splinter DemP 
and the RRP (Republican Reliance Party) of Turhan Fevzioglu gained representation
Sartori defined the extreme pluralism as a party system with a multipolar, polarized character and 
a centrifugal competition. Sartori, "The Polarized Pluralism," 139.
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in the Parliament affecting the fates of the parties from which they had 
disintegrated.'*^^
The leadership of Bülent Ecevit had placed the RPP on the left-of-the centre in 
a more consistent manner. Leftist socio-economic views, issued under the name of 
'Toward Bright Days' ( A k Günlere) were the main theme of the RPP's campaign for 
the 1973 elections.'**  ^ It seems to be that the RPP's opposition strategy appealing to 
the left-of-the centre policies, maintained since 1965, to reach the majority of the 
society -the workers and the peasantry- by detaching itself from its traditional 'grand 
coalition' of the military, bureaucracy and the landed notables, was fruitful in the 
1973 elections returning it as the majority party to the TGNA.'*'*' The RPP achieved to 
gain the support of urban lower classes, who used to vote for the DP and then the .IP, 
thanks to the energetic leadership of Bülent Ecevit who had well articulated the left- 
of-the centre image of the party in a time when the Turkish voters were in a process 
of realignment."^** Although this is partly true since it increased its rate over 30 per 
cent for the first time after the normalization of politics in the post 1960 period, the 
real factor behind the success of the RPP was the dissolution of the coalition made up 
the .IP electorate. The DemP, the NSP and partly the NAP, who once formed the .IP 
basis, polled about 27 per cent in the elections, while the RPP began to regain some 
of the votes which had been lost to the RP in 1969.
During the period between 1950 to 1971, there was a strong tendency towards 
electoral domination by the two major parties and the formation of majority 
governments. Governments used to be formed by one party, except early 1960s when 
the military constrained the normal workings of the party system in an effort to
The results of the 1973 elections as the percentage of the votes cast (V) and the percentage of the 
seats obtained in the TGNA (S) are: the RPP (V. 33.30, S. 41.10), the JP (V. 29.80, S. 33.10), the 
DemP (V. 11.90, S. 11.00), the NSP (V. 11.80, S. 10.70), the RRP (V. 5.30, S. 2.90), the NAP (V. 
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restructure electoral politics. The parliamentary strengths of the minor parties were 
very limited. But, the composition of the 1973 TGNA made coalition governments 
inevitable. However, a workable coalition, which would agree on a program able to 
satisfy each party in the government, was unlikely since the scores of the policy- 
oriented system parties, the RPP and the .IP, had made them felt that it was just one 
step away from an absolute majority and that cooperation would only harm their 
chances in the next e l e c t i on .The  alternative, the coalition of the system parties 
with the parties who had anti-system tendencies, would make the government 
unworkable that would strengthen the social support behind the opposition. So, the 
resulting antagonistic and non-consensual behavior of the party leaders tended to be a 
major factor in the polarization of the relations between parties that perpetuated the 
unwillingness of the system parties to reach an accommodation despite mounting 
socio-economic problems.Ins tead,  the party elites preferred to increase the 
ideological polarization in the party system through centrifugal tendencies that would 
secure their basis against both the rival and, at the same time, the parties in the same 
flank. Otherwise, they would lose votes to the extreme alternatives that would further 
weaken the major parties.
The ideological polarization in the party system was further sharpened by the 
effects of the volatility in the bases of party support and frequent deputy transfers 
from one party to the other in the Parliament. The higher score of volatility was the 
rule of the 1970s that decreased the ability to predict party fortunes in one election 
from their performance in the preceding one.'^- When the electoral instability was 
added to the parliamentary defections, the political leaders sought to maintain party 
unity and discipline in the Parliament as well as, at least, the continuation of the 
party's electoral support with an opposition strategy which depended on ideological
Zürcher, A Modern History, 276.
Sabri Sayari, "The Crisis of the Turkish Party System: 1973-1980," prepared for the Conference 
on: 'History and Society in Turkey' ( Berlin, 1981 ), 2.
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demagogues increasing polarization between the major system parties as pushing 
them toward the extremes within a centrifugal competition. The leaders of both 
parties believed that any attempt in the direction of depolarization would narrow the 
ideological distance between the two parties, increasing the possibility of 
defect ions .This  made the political system very competitive both for the system 
parties as well as the extremist parties, like the NSP and the NAP which were 
questionable in their loyalties to the existing system. The result portrayed a polarized 
multipolar party system in which the type of competition is centrifugal in the lines of 
ideological themes and there is no real alternative to the government, but an 
irresponsible opposition leading the political system to the politics of out-bidding and 
of unfair competition.
The irresponsibility of the opposition during the 1973-1980 period developed 
alongside the increasing ideological polarization which manifested itself in the 
polemical exchanges between the competing parties. So that, the intra-elite cleavages 
became more exacerbated as a result of the increasing ideological distance between 
parties. Although, both the .IP and the RPP proclaimed full commitment to democratic 
principles, they sought to delegitimize each other on the extremist terms, in the sense, 
that the .IP tried to show the RPP as a party infiltrated by the militant leftists, the RPP, 
on the other hand, often complained about the JP of collaborating with fascist 
political forces. The intensity of the accusations were so high that the loyal 
opponents, too, were attributed with anti-system political goals and strategies.
Unwilling to use conciliatory strategies in opposition toward each other, the 
system loyal parties, the JP and the RPP, became increasingly dependent on the minor 
parties, particularly those of the NSP and the NAP who, covertly or sometimes 
overtly, exhibited anti-system policy orientations and strategies,either in opposition or
Sayari, "The Crisis," 9-10. 
Ibid., 6-7.
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in government that tended to produce an unfair competition. This gave them a 
blackmailing potential on the system parties which provided them with a power 
disproportionate to their number in the TGNA. The major parties had to give them or 
their ideas a place in their programs or, at least, in expression in order not to further 
alienate but even to attract the electorate flowing to the extremes. However, this could 
not be achieved without making some modifications in the traditional policies and 
structures that tended to approach the system parties to semi-loyality. Since the 
extreme parties, particularly the NSP and the NAP, had the power to attract votes 
from the system parties, mainly from the .TP, these system-loyal parties tended to 
behave in a semiloyal way even if they were not.
Although the major parties were pulled toward extremes because of the 
ideologically polarized centrifugal tendencies, the electorate largely remained to be in 
a form of the centripetal competition. What was expected is that, the lack of the 
government in efficacy, which is the ability of the government to find solutions to the 
socio-economic problems, and effectiveness which is the capacity actually to 
implement the policies formulated, with the desired results, weakens the legitimacy of 
the government and the regime. In that case, it increases the support for the radical 
alternatives presented by the extreme opposition parties that ends with the breakdown 
of the regime.'^^ However, in the period between 1973 and 1980, the cooperation of 
the major parties with those who presented radical alternatives, approached the 
decentralized multipolar party system, at the electorate level, to a moderate 
p lura l i sm.The  political tendencies of the larger electorate remained to be centre- 
oriented in which support for the ideological extremes was weak. Although the 
governments of the period lacked in efficacy and effectiveness, the electoral support
Linz, "Berakdown,” 16-24.
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and parliamentary representation of the extreme parties did not increase to a point 
which would pose a threat to the existing regime.
Still, the existence of the extreme parties in the parliament, even in the key 
positions, brought a multipolarity to the strategies of opposition in the parliament. 
The moderate as well as the extreme parties felt the need to stress on their 
distinctiveness through posing criticisms to some of the policies of their near 
alternatives while forming a united front to the common enemy situated on the other 
side of the political spectrum. The expected result is that the ideological front would 
avoid the defection of the electorate to the other side of the ideologically fixed line as 
the intra-pole opposition was intended to catch votes from the parties in the same 
front that would be provided them with a majority or a better score in the elections. 
The multipolarity of the parliamentary opposition was the major factor which 
rendered the coalitions, made up of right wing parties in the Parliament, unworkable.
Having been illustrated the structural tendencies of the period that were to 
determine the nature of opposition of the parliamentary parties, we can turn to the 
opposition policies of the parties employed against the opponents with the aim to 
effect the policies of the government and/or to increase their chance in the elections. 
Although, given the results of the 1973 elections, the most workable coalition would 
be between the RPP and the JP, who hold similar views on regime issues and that 
would fix the extreme opposition parties in a trivial position in the TGNA, since the 
minor parties had either very distinctive system orientations or strict personal rivalries 
against the leaders of the major parties, Demirel declared that his party preferred not 
to take place in any coalition and would stay in opposition which was the 
responsibility given it by the electorate.'^* In fact, he had hoped that the existing party 
system of the parliament tended to produce a weak and unstable coalition which was
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Tevfik Çcivdar, "Adcilet Partisi," in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 8 ( Istanbul: 
iletişim ), 2096.
82
to be unable to solve the mounting problems of the country that would erode the 
electoral support of those who took place in the government. So, it would be a chance 
to regain the votes lost to the extreme right parties who would cooperate with the RPP 
as they would contribute to delegitimization of the RPP in the eyes of the leftist 
electorate.
It was an opportunity for the .IP to launch its destructive opposition strategies 
which are mainly based on ideological right-left rivalry, when the RPP managed to 
form a coalition with the pro-religious NSP. It would, now, gather the rightist support 
behind the ,1P, even would take votes from the moderate left if it achieved to make the 
voters believe that the RPP, in fact, is a communist party. Then, Demirel began to 
stress on the anti-Kemalist and procommunist nature of the RPP. He asserted that the 
RPP had deviated from many principles of Kemalism, some of the 'six arrows' had 
been broken away by the RPP. It, Demirel asserts, was protecting the leftist, 
communist terrorists despite it used to deny its communist nature and presented itself 
to be a Kemalist p a r t y . T h e  strategy of the .IP's opposition began to demonstrate 
also centrifugal characteristics when it cooperated with the extreme right NAP in 
opposition to the Ecevit-headed coalition that also indicated the beginning of a rightist 
front which was to determine the near future of the country.
The rightist opposition increased when the RPP proposed an amnesty, in May 
1974, for the prisoners who had been sentenced because of the Articles 141 and 142 
of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibited the formation of organization advocating 
the supremacy of one social class over another. The opposition of the .TP and the NAP 
aimed at also decreasing the conservative basis of the NSP that would pull these votes 
to their own ranks as well as the .TP would regain the votes lost to the NSP. The 
coalition of the NSP with the leftists, 'communists', was presented to be a betrayal to 
its 'nationalist' electorate. Although the program of the coalition was moderate in
199 Cizre Sakallioglu, AP-Orclu, 135.
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terms of the support given to the private sector and it refrained from mentioning about 
the land reform which had been the slogan of the election campaign by Ecevit, the 
coalition was declared by the rightist opposition, headed by Demirel, as the first 
'leftist government' of Turkey.
Meanwhile, Cj^rus crisis on which the right was very cautious, broke out. This 
increased the responsibility of the opposition parties as it eased the relations between 
government and the opposition. The Prime Minister Ecevit held meetings with the 
opposition leaders on the question which heightened the crisis to the level of a 
'national problem'. The criticisms of the opposition decreased and stopped as the 
attitude of the government against this external problem was supported until the 
extermination of the problem with the victory of the Turkish troops who controlled 
northern part of the Island. However, the government’s success in holding the 
problem weakened the opposition, especially against Ecevit, the leader of the RPP, 
who had come out to be a folk hero. The popularity of Ecevit risen rapidly in the eyes 
of the society.“"' A possible early election would return the RPP as the majority party 
able to form the government alone in the Parliament. On the other hand, the 
fragmentation of the opposition in the TGNA made Ecevit confident that he could 
force the Parliament to go to renew the elections in which he could gain a comfortable 
majority. So that, he gave an end to the unstable coalition, in September 1974, that 
had fell into crisis with the NSP’s pro-religious social policies which had been 
steadily increased in order to differentiate itself from the 'leftist' RPP. It was the time 
to return the popularity of a victorious war to votes in the polls.
However, the rightist coalition was aware enough not to give a way to Ecevit. 
They saw the need that elections should have been postponed as far as possible in 
order to leave the RPP out of the power. If the RPP was left in opposition, the hero
Ahmad, Demokrasi Süreci, 391-393. 
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image of Ecevit would be eroded from the minds of the people. In that case, a rightist 
government should have been established, but it was difficult to reach to an 
agreement on the leadership since the DemP members, who had personal enmity 
toward Demirel, tended not to accept the leadership of Demirel.
In fact, the main problem of the right was their bilateral opposition strategies. 
On the one hand, they had to oppose to the RPP, this time, not only for ideological 
considerations, but also for avoiding an early election which would eliminate them 
from the political scene since they depended largely on the uncertain floating votes. 
The prevention of the early election, on the other hand, was to mean, for the smaller 
parties, a coalition with the .IP that would lead to their loss of identity and eventual 
absorption; and most certainly a loss of voters to the ,iP in any election. Such 
considerations of the minor parties created a series of government crisis and the 
establishment of the caretaker governments which were unable to solve the socio­
economic problems of the country, in the absence of a strong parliamentary support. 
And no parliamentary party was willing to give support to a government that would 
weaken its support in the electorate. In the end, Demirel managed to form a rightist 
coalition, in March 1975, which was to be called as the 'Nationalist Front' government 
( Milliyetçi Cephe) in which the NSP, the NAP, the RRP, who had emerged with 
integration of the Republican Party disintegrated from the RPP with the RP of 
Fevzioglu, and splinter deputies from the DP included.The 'nationalist' name of the 
coalition had been chosen to indicate what the other, the RPP-headed government 
was. The 'Rightist Front against the Left, namely the RPP, was to bring a moral 
pressure on all the parties of the right in order to isolate the RPP as a minority 
party-“T Since they could not dare to compete with 'folk hero Ecevit' in the elections, 
Demirel succeeded in blocking the great opportunity of his main opponent and had 
enough time to regain the rightist voters under the roof of the .IP until the next
Ahmad, Experiment, 346-350. 
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elections.20^ Ecevit claimed that the nationalist' co-action of the right, in fact, was a 
tactic used by Demirel to by-pass the divisive effects of the PR system in the post- 
1971 period.205
What was interesting is that the .IP had needed to make some changes in the 
policies of the party in order to strengthen the ties with the people that had been 
weakened by the RPP's populist defection and fragmentation of its traditional 
electorate. The RPP had done and gained a momentum since the declaration of the 
left-of-the centre policies. Otherwise, it would come to urge of disappearance in the 
next elections. The stress was on the measures to be taken for increasing the life 
standards of labor; the development of the Eastern provinces through credits to be 
given to the private sector; control and decrease prices and so inflation. Still, it 
declared that the poverty was to be curtailed but never to be exploited with which it 
implied abuses in the RPP's policies. Peace and order would be preserved within the 
laws and securing the superiority of Law.-'^^
However since the rigid and ideological anti-communism or anti-RPP had made 
it virtually a coalition against something rather than for something, the ideological 
colonization of the state apparatus was given the priority in the coalition partners, 
particularly those of the NSP and the NAP. In fact, this was the result of the process 
of ideological polarization in Turkish politics, took place since the 1960s. The 
political preferences of high ranking bureaucrats, including those of higher courts, 
had become more diversified after 1961 that increased the tendency of political 
parties to become more distrusting of bureaucrats. Since these bureaucratic 
mechanisms had effective authority in the exercise of the political power, it prompted 
political parties to capture the state by their co-ideologists. The civil servants were 
began to reshuffled in an arbitrary fashion by the members of the coalition partners to
Ahmad, Demokrasi Süreci, 403.
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the extent that each ministry was taken under the complete jurisdiction of a political 
party against which even the Council of State became ineffective.-·*’ In the course, 
they did not refrain even from violating laws and disrespecting the decisions of the 
H igher Courts which were to review the legality of the government decisions.’·**·
In that case, although the program of the NF government contained some 
elements of the RPP's leftist policies, Ecevit started a strong opposition struggle, from 
its beginning, stressing on the ideological character of the government which had 
been colored with the fascist elements because of the disproportionate weight of the 
NAP within the government’·*·*. Reminding repeatedly the fascist threat coming from 
the government partners, particularly the NAP, Ecevit presented the goal of the RPP's 
opposition as the preservation of the regime which would turn into an authoritarian 
fascist system. It was the fight for democracy that had been threatened, for Ecevit, by 
the rightist terror in the streets and rightist colonization of the bureaucracy at the state 
level.’*·*
In fact, not only Ecevit himself, but also party cadres were on the side of 
carrying on a severe opposition against the Nationalist Front government. Although 
Ecevit criticized the nature and the policies of the government on every occasion, he 
had been frequently criticized by the members of the RPP on being too passive 
against the government. Some members claimed that despite having the opportunity 
of being as the main opposition party in the TGNA, the RPP seemed, by the such 
segments of the party cadres, to be not an opposition but a gentle ( 'muhalefet değil, 
mülayim') before the NF government. Ecevit was invited to have a stronger (noisy- 
'gürültülü') stand against the government.’”
’ ·*’ Heper, State, 113-115.
’·**· Heper, "Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of A Monocentrist Policy? International 
Journal of Turkish Studies. I (Winter, 1979-1980 ), 106.
’·*·* Two of the NAP's three deputies were given ministership in the NF government.
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In that case, proving the ineffectiveness of opposition in the Parliament where 
the right demonstrated a coherent solidarity against the RPP in an ideologically 
polarized party system, Ecevit turned to the society. In order to effect the government 
and the electorate, he intended to raise the public opinion through the public meetings 
that would be more decisive to decrease the social support for and to blockade the 
policies of the government he assumed to be fascist. His speech, in a public meeting 
in Istanbul, illustrated the intensity and the main theme of the opposition launched by 
Ecevit against the NF government:
...We did not find democracy in the street, and we shall not abandon it 
there. Let those pathetic people with a yearning for fascism knows this. 
Some people may have fascist inclinations, but Turkey shall not become 
fascist. Even if those with fascist inclinations come to power for a while, 
they will not be able to bring fascism to Turkey. The Turkish people are 
freedom-loving, people with self-respect, and too proud to live willingly 
under a regime other than democracy. Those in government today are 
tiying to destroy the state. They are undermining the high courts and 
constitutional foundations o f the state, and they are planning to dress 
armed hooligans in police uniforms to attack us with sate weapons. Tliey 
are tiying to bring anarchy to the countiy by going outside the institutions 
of the rule of law.^^^
Further, he accused the government of being supporting the discriminatory and 
oppressive policies against the Alevis and the Kurdish population, although it 
damaged the RPP's traditional Kemalist nature that it tended to reject the Kemalist 
concept of nation and the idea that Turkey was a homogeneous nation state.-^ ·^  On 
these statements, Demirel severely criticized Ecevit of having been identifying 
himself as a Turkish citizen rather than a Turk.-^^ On the other hand, the sympathetic 
approach of Ecevit toward the ethno-secterian social fractions further agitated the 
NAP- sympathized armed militants who increased their attacks to the RPP meetings
Ecevit's speech in Istanbul (28 June 1975), cited in Ahmad, Experiment, 321. 
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on which the government tended not to take effective measures to avoid. Although it 
clearly signified an unfair competition of the opposition, the constant attacks to the 
RPP and the leftists groups, by keeping the issue of communism in the limelight, 
served mainly to the interests of the JP who would make strong claim on the necessity 
of a strong rightist government. Further, it seemed to be that the rightist militants 
were being tolerated and even protected by the .IP and its leader Demirel who once 
declared that 'you can not make me say that rightists are committing murder'.“'^  The 
approach of Demirel signified how far away were the leaders of the loyal parties from 
a peaceful accommodation which would bring a solution to the amounting socio­
economic problems of the country.
An opposition is expected to be responsible if it knows that it may be called to 
execute what it has promised. Since, they would not have the effective leadership or 
the major responsibility in the governing coalition, in a multipolar polarized party 
system, the extreme smaller parties are likely to engage in irresponsible opposition 
policies.-*'’ However, the major parties of the post-1973 politics too, particularly the 
.IP, exhibited irresponsible opposition policies in its strategy of the centrifugal 
competition. But, smaller parties, mostly the NAP, being aware of the advantages of 
highly polarized competition, demonstrated explicit irresponsibility to the degree of 
sponsoring the nationalist paramilitary organizations. And it contributed to increasing 
polarization which served avoiding a possible accommodation between the near­
centre parties that would, at least, perpetuate their key positions in the political 
system.
Since the extreme parties decreased the stability of the coalition pursuing 
policies independent of each other, socio-economic problems, like left-right armed 
struggle, unemployment and inflation, steadily acquired an unsolvable character.
-*  ^ Agaogullari, "Ultranationalist," 201. 
-*'’ Sartori, "Polarized Pluralism," 157-158.
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Application of austerity programs had become inevitable. However, It postponed by 
the governments since an attempt of economic reform would decrease the social 
support of the governing parties while increasing the chance of the opposition. 
Unwilling to implement economic reforms, the .IP decided for an early election to be 
held in .June 1977.
The campaign of 1977 elections sharpened the polarization, especially between 
the parties who were closer to the power. Since they had closer scores, any further 
gain would turn the party as the majority government. So, Ecevit presented the 
election as a regime preference: the .TP and the other right parties, particularly the 
N AP, meant the domination of fascism in the country as the RPP was presented itself 
to be the champion of democracy. He organized 'Independence and Peace' meetings 
which were supported also by the extreme left that seemed to be a search for a front 
on the left as well. During these meetings, Ecevit demanded cooperation of the 
democratic forces in the struggle against fascism. He negotiated with Behice Boran, 
the leader of the LPT, and M. Ali Aybar of Socialist Union Party in order to enlist 
the extreme leftist votes that would make incremental contribution for the victory of 
the RPP although he did not seek a permanent partnership with extreme left.-'"^
Against the accusations of the opposition, the government parties campaigned 
also on the ideological terms stressing on socialist tendencies of Ecevit and his party. 
Demirel blamed of Ecevit of protecting the leftist militants, who were, for him, the 
main cause of the social instability in the country; of demarcating Kemalism, of 
provoking ethnic separatism in the country.-** That was to delegitimize the RPP both 
in the eyes of Kemalist electorate as well as the military which was the main guardian 
of the Kemalist principles. That is to say, the opposition policies of even major parties
Duru, Ecevit, 23-35.
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involved themes which would initiate a military action or an extended social strife 
based on ethnic cleavages.
In fact, the opposition as well as the government parties engaged in a process 
of mutual delegitimization. The terrorist actions of the extreme left and right groups 
provided parties on each side of the ideological spectrum with a convenient argument 
to undermine the legitimacy of their opponents. Even, the mutual criticisms of those 
parties who committed to the existing regime were in a high intense that sought to 
mark them as anti-system parties.-*^
On the other hand, bilateral tendencies of opposition increased in the eve 
elections. Taking into consideration the volatility of the electorate, the parties of the 
NF government needed to differentiate themselves from the other parties, who appeal 
to the similar social bases, so as to secure a safe base for the election that would 
increase, at least, preserve their position in the next parliament. For example, the NAP 
made special efforts to delineate itself from the .IP and other parties of the right before 
the 1977 elections on emphasizing its anti-capitalist ideology and claiming the 
monopoly of the true nationalism. In the public meetings, it addressed itself to the 
social sectors crushed by the big capital, like lumpen proletariat, workers, tradesmen 
and artisans. Further, it began to give a special stress on the religious sentiments.--*'
The 1977 elections, which was held in the atmosphere of increasing violence 
and economic crises, exhibited a trend to return to a two-party system in Turkey. The 
RPP, profiting from the unable, weak coalition of the right parties, increased its 
electoral score as well as parliamentary representation. The .IP also increased its share. 
The minor parties, except the NAP whose relative success was based on adoptation of 
a new and broad view combining nationality with religion with the purpose of
Sayari, "The Crisis," 7.
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redifining the Turk's national identity,“ ’ came closer to disappearance. The NSP lost 
half of its representatives in the Parliament.--“
The .IP had succeeded in gathering the anti-RPP votes through the campaign 
which warned the rightist electorate that the division of the rightist votes works only 
for the good of the RPP. The voters who previously supported the NSP, the DemP 
came to vote for the .IP who was the biggest obstacle and the near alternative to the 
RPP victory.--^
Upon the failure of Ecevit's attempt to form a minority government, the 
President Fahri Koruturk appointed Demirel to form a coalition government strong 
enough to solve the mounting problems of the country. Showing the signs of 
depolarization, Ecevit invited the .IP for the formation of a grand coalition. For 
Ecevit, the Turkish political system underwent periodic restorations that had been 
done by the military authorities so far. This time, it would be achieved by the civilian 
authorities.--^’ But, Demirel, considering the fruitful results of the centrifugal 
competition that would be lost in case of a depolarization tendency, rejected the RPP's 
proposal and preferred to form a second National Front' government with the NSP 
and the N AP.
The sharp polarization between the RPP and the .IP and the personal rivalry of 
the leaders avoided establishment of a stable coalition between them. However, the 
RPP continued to increase its electoral support in opposition against the .IP who had 
began to fall into internal crisis. Some deputies of the .IP had began to be disturbed by
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the Demirel's NAP-like ultranationatist policies and they claimed that the JP was 
sliding toward the NAP which was openly supporting national socialism whose time 
has passed.““^  They advocated the establishment of a coalition with the RPP. The 
intra-party opposition within the JP reached to a peak when the party fared badly 
against the opposition in the local elections held toward the end of 1977. The JP lost 
its internal cohesion. Then, twelve representatives retired from the JP and helped the 
RPP opposition to bring about the fall of the government in order to form a coalition 
with the RPP.
All independents were given cabinet posts when they agreed on a coalition with 
the RPP. The program of the government stressed the preservation of peace and order 
in the country rather than solutions to be brought exacerbating the economic crisis. 
However, the opposition, this time, was not as peaceful as the RPP. It was ready to do 
everything to prepare the basis for the failure of the government in its prominent 
promises. As the .TP questioned the legitimacy of the government which was a 
'government by occupation' {Isgal Hükümeti) even he refused to call Ecevit as 'prime 
minister',--* the NAP's sympathizers increased the social violence against the RPP and 
other leftist circles. In fact, terrorism worsened beyond control, while both the 
rightists and the leftists tried to prove the inability of any government to control thse 
evils.--’ The unfairness of the extremist opposition split over the mass society. It 
turned into sectarian-religious fights in some cities between Alevis who traditionally 
voted for the RPP and the NAP sympathized Sunnites. About 100 people died in 
Kahramanmaraş. On the Incident, the RPP accused the opposition, mainly the JP and 
the NAP, of provoking people to defense themselves against a perceived communism
Agaogullari, "Ultranationalist," 201. 
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within the RPP that, in fact, was instrumental for them to come to power since they, 
for Ecevit, would not get the power in a democratic competition.--**
However, the opposition succeeded in destabilizing the government and eroding 
its social support evidenced with the failure of Ecevit's government in solving the 
problems stemming from high inflation, unemployment and civil strife on which the 
society had invested great hope on Ecevit and his party. Further, the RPP lost also 
leftist support when the government had to declare a martial law to cope with the civil 
strife and when it had to accept an austerity program imposed by the IMF in order to 
find foreign credits which were vital to face up to economic problems exacerbated by 
the effects of the world economic recession and the continuing Western economic 
embargo since the Cyprus War. Although there was no alternative if the problems are 
to be solved, the opposition, led mainly by the ,1P leader Demirel, increased the 
intensity of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition against the socio­
economic regulations of Ecevit government and its inevitable outcomes over the 
lower classes. The aim of Demirel was to keep the ideological polarization higher so 
as to further concentrate the anti-RPP rightist votes and those who would alienate 
from the RPP under the roof of the .IP.
Unfortunately, Demirel did not refrain, even, from sending some covert 
massages to the Armed Forces to intervene to the policies of Ecevit government. He, 
in evaluating economic measures of the government, said that 'Biilende', identifying 
Bülent Ecevit, was to share the same fate with Ailende, implying the end of the 
socialist leader of Chile who had been deposed by the military.--*  ^ Later, Demirel 
explained this as a misunderstanding that, in fact, his aim was to show the results of
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the economic regulations which were to be continued, in a more strict manner, by 
himself after 1979.-30
The results of the partial elections for the Senate and the by-elections for the 
TGN A marked the success of the destructive, less responsible and sometimes unfair 
strategy of the opposition. Keeping the social unrest higher and endless criticisms 
against whatever done by the government brought the failure of the Ecevit-headed 
coalition. The government could not achieve peace and order staying within the 
borders of the civilian authorities. It had to declare a martial law, and even prohibit 
May 1st celebrations in Istanbul. Although, except anti-system radical proposals of 
the NSP and the NAP, the loyal opposition did not present a reasonable alternative for 
solution of the socio-economic problems, it had severely criticized the structural 
economic regulations of the government which had decreased further the life 
standards of the lower classes.
Taking into consideration the situation of the extreme parties, the NSP and the 
NAP, who performed no better than the previous elections, it was evident that the 
Turkish electorate is centre oriented. Even inability of the near-centre parties in 
dealing with the socio-economic problems, like political violence and economic 
crisis, did not push the electorate to search for radical solutions. However, it should 
also be indicated that the centrifugal tendencies of the major system parties which had 
become able to integrate most of the demands of the parties on their extremes was 
also effective in return to a 'near two-party system' in Turkey, by 1979 elections.
However, although the only way to stop this centrifugal drive and polarization 
would have been a rapprochement between the two major parties that would have 
been welcomed by a large majority of Turkish voters and by many vital institutions, 
including the military and the business associations, the ideological polarization
230 Ibid., 99.
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intensified with the bilateral opposition strategies (particularly of the JP) deterred 
them from taking place in a coalition which would have been strong enough to deal 
effectively with political violence and economic crisis. The lack of cooperation, 
collaboration, and compromise among political leaders had led to destruction of the 
political balance, between the two major political parties-the JP and the RPP which 
had guaranteed the survival of democracy and of the regime in the past.-^'
Upon the fall of Ecevit government after the 1979 partial elections, Demirel 
formed a minority government with outside support of the NAP and the NSP. 
Following the economic regulations of the previous Ecevit government, Demirel 
declared a new austerity program, called as the .lanuary 24, 1980 Decisions, in order 
to transform the import-substituted economic system into an export-oriented model.
Although implementation of the program necessitated a stable political 
condition in which the opposition was weaker or silent, the government had to satisfy 
its outer supporters as well as to cope with the destructive policies of the RPP who 
frequently came out with the interpellations to vote out the government that would be 
possible if the JP could not satisfy the partners. In spite of being aware that there was 
no alternative, the RPP, in an irresponsible manner, managed to organize a united 
opposition front with the NSP, who began to exhibit explicit anti-secular, pro­
religious tendencies in the Assembly in order to depose the JP government.-^- This 
increased the political instability further decreasing the ability of the JP government, 
from its establishment, in dealing with the socio-economic problems.
On the other hand, although the major parties in the TGNA used to cooperate in 
the issue of presidential elections since 1961, the polarization between the two parties 
had reached to a point that they were incapable of electing a successor to the President 
Korutiirk, when his term expired in 1980, even after 100 round of voting. The
Karpat, "Impasse," 41. 
-^- Ibid., 40.
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political system had really needed a restoration as Ecevit said in 1977, but unlike his 
intention, the civilian authorities were unable to achieve it. Delegitimization of the 
opponent, whether in government or in opposition, had become the rule of the 
political game that would not permit creation of a rapprochement between political 
parties. In the end, the military intervened on 12 September 1980 in order to 
reestablish the Turkish democracy that would redefine the rules of the political system 
in a direction to change the understanding and patterns of political opposition in 
T urkey.
General Evaluation o f  the Period
The fragmentation and polarization of the party system on the ideological lines 
degenerated the program-based oppositional attempts of the out parties in the post- 
1973 Turkish politics. The ideological demagogies based on 'anti-fascism' or 'anti­
communism' became the main themes of the oppositional processes. The alternative 
was introduced to be a regime preference which let to division of the political 
spectrum into two rival blocks. In that case, the main goal of the political parties was 
to hold the political power in their hands and not to give a way to the other side of the 
ideologically fragmented political system. However, since the electoral processes 
made the coalition governments inevitable, the smaller parties, particularly those of 
the extreme ones, obtained a vital place in the strategies of the bigger parties, namely 
the RPP and the JP. Engaging in a process of mutual delegitimization, the system- 
loyal parties gave up their centripetal competition of the 1960s. In order to attract the 
support of the extremist parties and the electorate, they integrated some of their 
radical demands and strategies that approached the .IP and the RPP to semiloyality in 
their opposition policies. The leaders of the loyal parties radicalized their discourses 
launched toward its main rival, the other loyal party. Although, increasing tendency 
of the socio-economic problems necessitated a peaceful accommodation between the 
two major parties, it was avoided by this centrifugal competition.
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On the other hand, the opposition attempts, in its multipolarity of the party 
system, were directed not only against the parties of the ideologically rival camp, but 
also to the parties of the same block. In a bilateral pattern, the political parties, both of 
opposition and the government, needed to differentiate themselves from their near 
alternatives, in order to preserve their positions from one election to the other in the 
higher volatile patterns of the electorate.
The opposition is expected to be weak in a parliament where it is dispersed and 
this trend is further strengthened unless the parties hold strong internal cohesion or 
engage in permanent alliances. Still, although the ideological polarization of the 
period favored the solidarity of the nearer parties in the Assembly that created 
oppositional fronts, especially against the RPP-headed governments, it was not 
successful in the TGNA. In that case, the public opinion became the main target of 
the oppositional attempts. Beside this, some extremist parties tended to provide 
support for the paramilitary organization in their oppositional strategies. Such parties 
produced an irresponsible and unfair competition in the political system.
The oppositional attempts of the post-1973 period was a kind of'politics of out­
bidding'. Since the government was perceived as posing threat to the existing regime, 
in an ideologically fragmented and polarized political system, the opposition as well 
as the government parties defined their strategies to defeat the other. In this process, 
the symbolic and polemical confrontations based on the ideological discourses 
weighted the struggles of the opposition parties. They did not produce pragmatic 
solutions, taking into consideration the real problems of the country and the demands 
of people. Contrarily the political competition began to demonstrate a trend toward 
the 'politics of absurd' that was ended in the military intervention in 1980.
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CHAPTER V.
Conclusion
The political opposition in Turkish politics experienced a process of crisis in 
institutionalization from which opposition of the parliamentary parties was not 
immunet. The intolerant political culture, monocentrist economic structure and 
authoritarian legal system were the obstacles before the peaceful evolution of political 
opposition. Even the trials of competitive politics could not accommodate a tradition 
of opposition and they culminated in authoritarianism of the ruling parties until the 
establishment of a liberal political system and a balanced legal structure in 1960.
The 1960 Constitution secured the existence of political opposition in Turkish 
political system. The targets of regime-oriented policies of the previous opposition 
parties were realized in the political structure of the post-1960. Limitation of political 
power, dispersion of its authority among some judicial and administrative institutions 
and a new electoral law based on proportional representation, empowered the 
mechanisms of political opposition against the government. Although, it used to seek 
basically structural amendments for the further democratization of the political 
system, that had been seen as a barrier against the authoritarian tendencies of the 
government, from 1960 on, the opposition turned to perform its real functions. It 
began not only to check and balance the authority of government, but also to produce 
alternative socio-economic policies to those of the government.
However, during the transition period of the early 1960s, the opposition parties 
of the parliament could not act in accordance to their real policy preferences and 
opposition strategies. In order not to irritate the military who was cautious about the 
healthy institutionalization of the new political structure, the opposition parties had to 
consider the views of the military personalities in their policy formulations and 
opposition attempts. So that, the principles envisaged in the 1961 Constitution became
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the policies of the opposition parties, while the TGNA was the main site for the 
opposition attempts. Although, it was made 'very loyal' as being not much critical 
about the government, the opposition parties, among which the .IP was the major one, 
succeeded in blocking some of the policies of the government in the Parliament and 
steadily increased its public support. The fragmentation of the party system in the 
TGNA, which had made the establishment of coalition governments inevitable, 
increased the power of the opposition against the unstable governments.
Although it never defected toward irresponsibility, during the first half of the 
1960s, because of the influence of the military, the opposition parties demonstrated its 
most cooperative action on external policy of the government. The government was 
supported by the opposition in its holding the Cyprus crisis.
The opposition of the parliamentary parties was situated in its real position only 
toward and after the 1965 elections during which military existence in civilian politics 
had been released and the plural system of the post-1960 political structure had began 
to be realized. The policy formulations or the oppositional strategies of the parties 
changed by replacing the traditional ways of competition. The program-based 
competition began to weight the strategies of the opposition parties. They produced 
alternative socio-economic policies to those of the government in order to attract the 
support of the larger population. The socio-economic transformation, which 
accelerated toward the second half of the 1960s, further initiated the parties for the 
reformulation of their traditional policies. The RPP reoriented its policies toward the 
left-of-the centre which was expected to articulate the new demands of the people 
who were in a process of realignment caused by the socio-economic transformation. 
Still, the big parties in which the opposition concentrated in the TGNA became 
unable to integrate the social differentiation. New parties of opposition emerged with 
more radical and anti-system programs, in order to met the demands of the 
dissatisfied social sectors. So that, the Turkish party system fell in a process of 
fragmentation which effected the oppositional policies of the big parties too.
1 0 0
The emergence of the TLP, the NOP and the iiltranationalist defection of the 
NAP provided the Turkish electorate with radical policy alternatives by the second 
half of the 1960s. Although they could get much public support, they found 
representation in the TGNA simply due to the electoral law which favored smaller 
parties. Still, since the parliamentary procedures were in support of the majority, they 
could not impose much pressure on the policies of the government.
However, emergence of radical alternatives on the left and the right of the 
political spectrum effected the policy formulations of the big system-loyal parties. 
The left-of-the centre policies, which had been once chosen as an oppositional 
strategy, gained a stable root in the RPP. The .IP turned to implement policies in order 
to secure the support of the big bourgeois. The new stands of thse big parties 
triggered a process of internal oppositional within the traditional cadres of the big 
parties and led to eventual splits that further fragmented the party system. Adding the 
the pervious fragmentation on the line of ideological preferences, the party 
competition began to acquire a centrifugal competition toward the ends of 1960s.
On the other hand, the opposition discovered new sites in order to influence the 
policies of the government. The judicial-bureaucratic mechanisms, introduced by the 
authorities of the 1960 transition period, were effectively used by the opposing parties 
of the Parliament throughout the second half of the 1960s, with the aim to blockade 
the governmental policies, if not to change them.
The fragmentation of the late 1960s reflected itself in the post-1973 Parliament 
that was to determine the oppositional policies of the parties. Since the political 
system had lost its predominant party charachter, the system-loyal big parties steadily 
depended on the ideologically extreme parties. The smaller radical parties held a 
blackmailing potential on the system-loyal parties, attracting some segments of their 
electorate. This increased centrifugal tendencies within the big parties and the 
program-based opposition degenerated into eventually rising symbolic and polemical
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confrontations between the system parties, namely the RPP and the .IP. The 
fragmented party system was divided into two block of the left and the right. In this 
framework, despite the parties of the same flank of the ideological spectmm pursued a 
bilateral opposition especially in the eve of elections, since the government of the 
'rival' block was perceived to be a regime preference in the polarizing mood of the 
ideological politics, even the system parties intended to oust the government of the 
'other' whatever the strategy to be used. In this process, even the unfair, irresponsible 
attempts of the extremes parties, particularly those of the NAP, reaching to the degree 
of supporting paramilitary anti-system organizations, were ignored, if not abused in 
oppositional attempts. Such actions prepared the basis in order to delegitimize the 
immediate alternative government on the accusations of anti-system trends. The result 
became the 'politics of outbidding' which deepened the uncompromising policies 
between the two major system parties. Although, they had used to cooperate on some 
basic issues, including foreign policy and presidential elections, the centrifugal 
opposition strategy of the parties eventually avoided them from maintaining the 
consensus on such basic issues. So that, the Turkish competitive politics fell in a crisis 
which ended in another military intervention in 1980.
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